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CHAPTER VIII

Bonaventure and Twentieth Century Thought

Throughout the central chapters of this book, I have attempted to establish my major claim: that the coincidence of opposites is the key to understanding the structure of Bonaventure's thought. For the coincidence of opposites reveals the logic of his theological metaphysics, which brings his philosophical metaphysics to a culmination and which provides the architechtonic pattern to his thought as a whole. Thus the coincidence of opposites provides a hermeneutical key for interpreting all the elements of his system. We have studied the evidence for this claim, both textually and systematically, in the Trinitarian and Christological poles of Bonaventure's thought; and we have seen its bearing on his doctrine of God's relation to the world, the epistemology of illumination, and the dynamics of history. This major claim involves two subordinate claims: (1) By clarifying Bonaventure's thought through the coincidence of opposites, we can better situate him within the history of thought. (2) Through the coincidence of opposites, we can find a gateway into the universal philosophical and theological issues which overarch the centuries and constitute the substance of the Great Dialogue in Western culture.

In the light of our major claim, we will explore in this chapter the two subordinate claims as these touch contemporary thought, especially twentieth century Christian theology. As we have indicated in the previous chapter, Bonaventure belongs to a tradition of Western thought which was by no means circumscribed to the Middle Ages. Through the coincidence of opposites we have already seen Bonaventure's relation to the subsequent development of this tradition as it unfolded in Nicholas of Cusa. In the present chapter we will observe how this tradition has flowed into the twentieth century and how it attempts to deal with problems which Bonaventure himself confronted. At this point Bonaventure can enter into the Great Dialogue, for in his era he penetrated so deeply into the universal issues that he has something creative to say in dialogue with twentieth century thinkers as they confront the same issues in our own time. Here the coincidence of opposites can clarify the universal issues and highlight Bonaventure's distinctive contribution to the dialogue. In this chapter our approach will be more issue-oriented than in the last, where we focused on the structural relationship of Bonaventure to Nicholas of Cusa. It would be illuminating to embark on a detailed comparative study of the structure of Bonaventure's thought and that of such twentieth century theologians as Rahner and Tillich. But such an enterprise is beyond the scope of the present chapter, where we will show structural similarities and differences chiefly as these have bearing on the universal issues. In this way we hope to reveal the vitality of Bonaventure's thought and to give an impetus to more systematic studies in the future on Bonaventure's relation to twentieth century thinkers.

Bonaventure's Relevance

At first glance, it may seem woefully anachronistic to examine Bonaventure in relation to twentieth century thought. For he lived in an age separated from ours by seven centuries, an age whose life-style, modes of thought, and challenges seem very foreign to our own. In contrast with the stable, homogeneous, and religious world of the Middle Ages, we live in a secular environment, overwhelmed by change and bewildered by diversity. In the accelerating pace of change, we find ourselves numbed by future shock and confused by conflicting visions of the future: images of Utopia and of cosmic catastrophe. Science and technology have conquered outer space at the very moment when we are exhausting the natural resources that support the future of technology and scientific research. On the religious scene, pluralism has supplanted a narrow orthodoxy, and ecumenism has expanded to the horizon of world religions.

Furthermore the major group which previously had drawn resources from the Middle Ages - namely, the Roman Catholic community - has to a large extent abandoned its medieval heritage. After Vatican II, many Catholics have thrown off medieval thought-patterns and are facing the modern world on its own terms. Even if they were interested in their past, Bonaventure seems too forgotten to be recalled. During the neo-scholastic revival, it was Thomas not Bonaventure who was in the fore; and within his own Franciscan tradition, Bonaventure was eclipsed by Duns Scotus. Therefore to see Bonaventure in relation to contemporary thought may seem like an irrelevant and even impossible task.

I believe that this task is neither impossible nor irrelevant. But in order to face this task squarely, we must begin by asking the question: How is Bonaventure related to contemporary thought? I do not wish to approach this question superficially, claiming that Bonaventure is "relevant" in a popular way; nor do I wish to impose medieval thought-patterns on the contemporary scene. On the contrary, I hold that one must penetrate through the distinctive medieval dimensions of Bonaventure's system to reach those universal issues that perdure beyond the particularity of historical epochs. Bonaventure represents one of the richest traditions in Western thought - a tradition that has flourished in different historical eras and in diverse geographic settings. It developed in the Byzantine East in the golden era of the Greek Fathers; it flourished in the Latin West from the early to the high Middle Ages; it flowered in the Renaissance and in the nineteenth century and it has emerged in a number of ways in the twentieth century. Bonaventure inherited this tradition from both Greek and Latin sources, and he exercised his genius in developing one of the most complex syntheses that this tradition has achieved. His success lay in the fact that he brought the depth of this tradition to bear on the challenges of his day, tapping its creative resources that are not limited to a particular time or place.

It is precisely this creative depth that is effective in meeting the challenges of a particular age. If we in the twentieth century are to meet the challenges of our day and of the future, then we must be in touch with all the resources of our past. It is crucial for us to know, in depth, the tradition Bonaventure represents; and it is especially beneficial to know that tradition in the rich synthetic form that Bonaventure has bequeathed to us. When he brought his tradition in contact with the issues of his day, he penetrated deeply into the mystery of reality. It is not surprising that he touched levels which are universal, which transcend the differences of historical periods and which are significant for us now in the twentieth century. It is on this level of creative depth that Bonaventure is relevant to the twentieth century. And it is through the coincidence of opposites that we can find our way into the universal issues and to the creative contributions that Bonaventure can offer to our times.

To relate Bonaventure to contemporary thought is complicated by both the richness and variety of twentieth century Christian theology. In scanning its development, one is struck by great polarities and intricate patterns of unity. After World War I and into the sixties, Christian theology was dominated by the figure of Karl Barth and by existentialist thought. In contrast with the liberal theology of the nineteenth century, this neo-orthodoxy focused on man's fallenness and on his radical need for salvation in Christ. Influenced by Heidegger, existentialist theologians, such as Rudolf Bultmann, analyzed man's subjectivity in its inauthenticity and in its authentic possibilities which could be realized through Christ. Paul Tillich combined the existentialist emphasis on subjectivity with a theology of culture. Karl Rahner based his theology on a notion of subjectivity drawn from existentialism and Transcendental Thomism.

During the sixties, a strong reaction set in to the supernaturalism of Barth and to the individualism of existentialism. The 'death of God' movement and secular theology proposed a 'religionless Christianity'. In a number of currents, the theological focus shifted from the individual to the collective and the cosmic. Interest developed in the thought of Teilhard de Chardin, which drew into a single theological perspective the entire physical universe and the totality of history. In the United States, Whiteheadian process theology gained increasing attention. Having been shaped by the scientific revolutions at the turn of the century, process thought took into account the entire universe and the temporal process as related to God. With roots in Hegel and Marx, the theology of hope, which developed in Germany, applied the eschatological consciousness of Biblical revelation to modern man in his social and political dimensions and in his hopes for the future. Closely associated with the theology of hope, liberation theology emphasized man's need to be freed from collective social, economic, and political oppression. Throughout the twentieth century interest in ecumenism has grown, both within Christianity and in relation to other religions. Christian theologians have attempted to expand their horizons to encompass the rich variety of man's religious experience and to develop a theology of the interrelation of religions.

Amid this complexity we can discern a number of themes that have resonance with Bonaventure's thought. The notion of God as dynamic has been a dominant motif of twentieth century theology; it is found in the Trinitarian theology of Rahner and Tillich and in the theology of hope. The same theme - with emphasis on God's involvement in the world - is developed in Whiteheadian process theology and in Teilhard's evolutionary vision, where it is expressed through the latter's doctrine of the cosmic Christ. In Tiliich and Rahner the presence of God is analyzed in human subjectivity; in a number of these theologians God's presence within the structures of the world and the dynamics of history becomes the basis of a theology of culture and a theology of history. In the case of the ecumenical theologians, God's presence in human experience and in the varieties of cultural forms provides the basis of a theology of ecumenism, formulated through the doctrines of the Trinity and Christ.

We see here a configuration of themes that coincides with the main outlines of Bonaventure's thought: the dynamic doctrine of God expressed in Trinitarian terms; the intimate relation of God and the world - within human subjectivity, in the structure of the universe, in the forms of culture and in the dynamics of history; the mystery of Christ the center, as the expression of God's presence in the world and as the unifying center of all dimensions of the cosmos. In the course of this chapter, we will see how these central themes draw Bonaventure into dialogue with contemporary thinkers; and in the following chapter we will see how Bonaventurian themes provide a resource for ecumenism. Our path or bridge between Bonaventure and the twentieth century will be the coincidence of opposites. Just as the coincidence of opposites led us into the depth of Bonaventure's vision, so it can lead us into the depth of the universal issues, where Bonaventure's thought transcends its medieval particularity and has direct bearing on the problems of the twentieth century. The coincidence of opposites will not only be our gateway into these problems but will provide the very solution which Bonaventure can offer as his distinctive contribution to the Great Dialogue.

In the course of this study, I will deal with three areas of Bonaventure's thought, seen through three types of the coincidence of opposites: (1) the Trinity, where self-sufficiency coincides with dynamism; (2) God and the world, where the infinite coincides with the finite; and (3) the Christocentric universe, where unity coincides with diversity. Our exploration will presuppose our previous exposition of Bonaventure's thought and our analysis of its various types of coincidence of opposites. With this as a background, we will recall the essential points as these touch universal issues and relate Bonaventure to twentieth century problematics.

The Dynamic Trinity

As we have seen, Bonaventure's doctrine of the Trinity is the foundation of his entire vision; along with the Christocentric pole, it provides the architectonic design of his system. In his theology, the Trinity is seen primarily as the mystery of the divine fecundity, with the Father as the fecund source of the Trinitarian processions. Thus Bonaventure can apply to the Father the principles of fecund primordiality and the self-diffusion of the good. According to the principle of fecund primordiality - derived from the Liber de causis - the Father is primary and hence the fecund source of the divine processions. According to the principle of the self-diffusion of the good - derived from the Pseudo-Dionysius - the Father is the source of the absolute self-diffusion of the good in the Trinitarian processions.⁴⁶⁷ This Trinitarian self-diffusion involves a dynamic coincidence of opposites, in which the Father's fecundity expresses itself in a movement into the Son and a return in the unity of the Spirit. Thus the Son is the medium of the Trinitarian dynamism or, as Bonaventure calls him, the persona media of the Trinity. This dynamic coincidence of opposites involves another; namely, the coincidence of unity and plurality. Since the Father's fecundity emanates in the Son and the Spirit, the dynamic Trinity necessarily involves a coincidence of unity and diversity on the level of the divinity itself.⁴⁶⁸

Although Bonaventure's doctrine of God involves a number of types of coincidence of opposites, I will focus here on one: namely, the coincidence of self-sufficiency and self-communication. It is true that Bonaventure emphasizes the dynamic aspect of God, but not to the neglect of God's self-sufficiency. In fact, he achieves one of the most impressive integrations of these two aspects of the divinity. As Arthur Lovejoy has pointed out in his book The Great Chain of Being, there has been a tension throughout the history of Western thought between two images of God: God as self-sufficient absolute and God as self-communicating fecundity.⁴⁶⁹ As self-sufficient, God is the timeless absolute, the unmoved mover, distant from the world and radically unlike the world. On the other hand, as self-communicating, God is outgoing, related, involved, sharing his perfections with the world. These two images seem incompatible and according to some are ultimately irreconcilable. Often in the history of thought, the image of God as self-sufficient has won out, producing a view of God as static and unrelated, a view which has been severely criticized in the twentieth century by Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.⁴⁷⁰ In contrast, the image of God as self-communicating has produced a finite God, dependent on the world for the activation of his fecundity.

This, then, is the dilemma facing theologians: If they ignore the divine fecundity, they produce an image of God as distant and unrelated - an image far removed from the Biblical God, who reveals himself as involved in the world and history even to the point of redeeming mankind through the Incarnation and Crucifixion. On the other hand, if theologians ignore the divine self-sufficiency, they run the risk of reducing God's transcendence to the limits of the world. How resolve this dilemma? Bonaventure faced the problem squarely, reconciling these two images of God through the coincidence of opposites. In the person of the Father in the Trinity, the two images coincide: As unbegotten, the Father is the root of the self-sufficiency in the Godhead, for he proceeds from no one. At the same time he is the fountain and source of the divine processions. Bonaventure not only sees these two images coexisting in the Father, but he sees them present by way of a coincidence of mutually affirming complementarity. This means that one implies and demands the other. For Bonaventure, to be unbegotten implies that the Father begets the Son; and to beget the Son implies that the Father is unbegotten. Thus by affirming one, we simultaneously affirm the other. According to Bonaventure's conception, then, we can say: Because the Father is absolutely self-sufficient, he is absolutely self-communicating.⁴⁷¹

What are the implications of this? It means that the image of God as dynamic, processive, self-communicating is not swallowed up by the image of God as self-sufficient. It enables Bonaventure to develop one of the richest doctrines of God as dynamic in the history of theology, a doctrine that has much to say to the process philosophers and theologians of modern times who have taken such pains to affirm the image of God as dynamic. I believe that the most significant contribution of Bonaventure to modern thought is his position that God is absolutely dynamic in his inner life and hence does not have to depend on the world to manifest himself.⁴⁷² Bonaventure claims that God is absolutely good; but the good is self-diffusive. Therefore God must be self-diffusive in an absolute way. This absolute self-diffusion of the good can be realized only in the Trinitarian processions: in the Father's generation of the Son and in their spiration of the Holy Spirit. If God had to depend on the world in order to diffuse his goodness, he would never be able to communicate himself adequately, for as Bonaventure says: "the diffusion that occurred in time in the creation of the world is no more than a pivot or point in comparison with the immense sweep of the eternal goodness."⁴⁷³

The metaphysical implications of this position are profound and far-reaching. Bonaventure has placed the ultimate dimension of God's transcendence precisely in his self-diffusing fecundity. This is indeed paradoxical, for the divine fecundity has led thinkers to see God immanent in the world, even to the point of being dependent on the world for the actualization of his fecundity. For Bonaventure God transcends the world in two ways: by his infinity in contrast with the world's finitude; secondly, by not being dependent on the world for the activation of his fecundity. What does this mean metaphysically? It frees God from the world and the world from God. For God does not need the world to activate his absolute fecundity, and the world does not have to sustain the overpowering self-diffusion of God.

Throughout the history of thought, the notion of divine fecundity has produced two problems: on the one hand, it has relativized God by placing his boundless fecundity on the Procrustean bed of the world; on the other hand, it has absolutized the world, at least in some respects. For example, philosophers have claimed that the principle of divine fecundity demands that all possibles be actualized within space and time and that this world is necessarily the best possible world. Bonaventure was acutely aware of the problems of the divine fecundity and developed a doctrine of divine transcendence based on fecundity. Yet Bonaventure's position in the history of this problem has not been adequately recognized, as is illustrated by the fact that in his survey of the problem in The Great Chain of Being, Lovejoy makes no mention of Bonaventure nor does he take into account the logic of Bonaventure's solution.⁴⁷⁴

In modern times, the problem of the divine fecundity has been acutely felt in Hegel's philosophy, where we find one of the most powerful statements of God as dynamic in the history of thought.⁴⁷⁵ On this issue, it is important for Bonaventure to enter into dialogue with Hegel, not only because the latter's doctrine is classic, but because it reveals in striking terms the underlying problematic behind the twentieth century's probing of the mystery of God as dynamic. The problematic has been underscored by religious thinkers who have criticized Hegel because he seems to make the world necessary for the self-manifestation of God. To counter Hegel, some would merely affirm God's transcendence through his infinity, claiming that Hegel's system is inadequate because it collapses into pantheism. Such a critique touches only half of the problem for it fails to take into account the metaphysics of the divine fecundity. The dynamics of the divine fecundity must not be ignored but must be confronted directly. If it is allowed to remain dormant, it will inevitably surface, at times naively and destructively, without the clarification of critical reflection. At this point Bonaventure could enter the debate, for he confronted the logic of fecundity directly. He affirmed the divine fecundity not only relatively, but absolutely. At the same time, he wanted to allow the world to share this fecundity without having to bear the impossible burden of the fullness of divine fecundity. There is reason to think that Bonaventure could make a significant contribution in a dialogue with Hegel and his critics. Bonaventure might lead critics to re-examine Hegel's texts to see if, in fact, Hegel held a doctrine of God equivalent to Bonaventure's; or if not, at least he might provide an alternative to Hegel's dynamic God which would allow critics to accept other elements of Hegel's system.

Whitehead and Process

Alfred North Whitehead also makes God dependent on the world in a way that goes counter to classical metaphysics and Christian theology.⁴⁷⁶ He criticizes the fusion of the notion of God as unmoved mover and eminently real:

The notion of God as the 'unmoved mover' is derived from Aristotle, at least so far as Western thought is concerned. The notion of God as 'eminently real' is a favourite doctrine of Christian theology. The combination of the two into the doctrine of an aboriginal, eminently real, transcendent creator, at whose fiat the world came into being, and whose imposed will it obeys, is the fallacy which has infused tragedy into the histories of Christianity and of Mahometanism.⁴⁷⁷

This he feels is a distortion of the Christian message for "there is, however, in the Galilean origin of Christianity yet another suggestion ... It dwells upon the tender elements in the world, which slowly and in quietness operate by love."⁴⁷⁸ As a metaphysical grounding of this alternative image of God, Whitehead develops his doctrine of the primordial and consequent nature of God, through which God is intimately involved in the creative process of the world, without destroying the autonomous creativity of each element in the process.⁴⁷⁹ God's primordial nature provides the ground of possibilities for each of the "actual entities" - the microcosmic units that make up the temporal process, in the Whiteheadian scheme.⁴⁸⁰ Each actual entity incorporates into itself an inheritance from the past and in its freedom produces its own novel realization in what Whitehead calls its "concrescence" before it perishes in the process. Its novel concrescence, however, provides data for the realization of future actual entities. Although God and the past contribute to the concrescence of an actual entity, they do not determine it. Rather each actual entity remains autonomously self-affirming in its becoming in the temporal process. In this way, the becoming of the actual entity is the realization of novelty. From one point of view Whitehead can say, "Apart from God, there could be no relevant novelty."⁴⁸¹ But from another point of view, novelty is realized by the actual entity itself in the process. Even with God as the ground of the process, the actual entity retains its autonomous self-creativity. Thus the temporal process can be looked upon as a collaborative enterprise involving God and the world.

The primordial nature of God is complemented by his consequent nature. As Whitehead says, "He is the beginning and the end."⁴⁸² As he was the beginning of the process in his primordial nature, so he is the completion of the process in his consequent nature. And in his consequent nature God himself is completed and enriched by the temporal process. Although his primordial nature is unchanged and complete, his consequent nature is in a state of becoming as a result of the temporal process. Since this pole is consequent upon the creative advance of the world, it is termed God's "consequent" nature. Actual entities do not perdure within the process; they last momentarily and perish. God draws up, or objectifies, these novel concrescences into his consequent nature, thus preserving everlastingly the values realized in the process. This everlasting existence is called "objective immortality." By drawing these values into himself, God is enriched in his consequent nature. Since in his primordial nature, God is deficient in actuality, he needs the temporal process for his fulfillment. But this enrichment is not aimed exclusively at God's own satisfaction; rather, he makes these values available again for the temporal process. Whitehead speaks of this as God's love for the world, saying: "What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world. In this sense, God is the great companion - the fellow-sufferer who understands."⁴⁸³

Thus God is intimately involved in the temporal process, which Whitehead calls "the creative advance into novelty."⁴⁸⁴ However, since God is not eminently real for Whitehead, he does not possess creativity in an absolute way. Rather both God and the world are caught in creativity, which in some sense transcends both and which Whitehead assigns to the category of the ultimate in his system.⁴⁸⁵ For Whitehead God is dynamic, not because he actualizes in himself the absolute expression of creativity, but as ground of the temporal process and as intimately involved in the temporal flow, which enriches his consequent nature as he in turn causes his love to flow back into the process.

Bonaventure's system bears certain resemblances to Whitehead's but with crucial differences. As for Whitehead, creativity is paramount for Bonaventure, but Bonaventure affirms absolute creativity of God, whereas Whitehead affirms it as relative. It must be noted here that Bonaventure does not affirm this absolute creativity through God's relation to the world, but within God's inner Trinitarian life. Furthermore, Bonaventure's image of God is not produced by the formula that Whitehead criticizes: namely by the fusion of the unmoved mover and the eminently real. Rather Bonaventure combines the opposites of self-sufficiency (unmoved mover) and self-communication (creativity). He considers both of these opposites as eminently real in the classical metaphysical and theological sense: namely, that God contains all perfections pertaining to these poles, in an absolute way, in a mode unlike that of creatures.

Like Whitehead's God, Bonaventure's God is dipolar, but completely within his inner life and not in relation to the world. Of course, for Bonaventure God is intimately related to the world because he is absolutely creative and related within his inner Trinitarian life, but not in a way that would make him dependent on the world. In an approach that is reminiscent of Bonaventure, Whitehead states six antonomies or coincidences of opposites in the final chapter of Process and Reality. They all deal with the relation of God and the world in the paradoxical mode expressed as follows: "It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God." Whitehead immediately continues: "God and the World are the contrasted opposites in terms of which Creativity achieves its supreme task of transforming disjointed multiplicity, with its diversities in opposition, into con-crescent unity, with its diversities in contrast."⁴⁸⁶

Like Whitehead, Bonaventure sees a coincidence of opposites between God and the world, but not precisely that of Whitehead; for Bonaventure sees a coincidence of opposites within the inner life of God which Whitehead does not affirm. In terms of White-head's system, Bonaventure's God is dipolar within his primordial nature, for he has a self-sufficient and a self-communicating pole. And unlike Whitehead, Bonaventure places pre-eminent creativity in the self-communicating pole of the divinity, on the level equivalent to the primordial nature of Whitehead's system. The coincidence of opposites within the divinity is the basis for the world's sharing in creativity. For Bonaventure the world shares in a creativity derived from the Trinity, not as for Whitehead in a category that transcends both God and the world. For Bonaventure the world shares in this creativity through the principle of participation. It must be remembered that for Bonaventure, the world participates not merely in being - in the self-sufficient pole of the divinity - but also in the divine creativity - in the self-communicating pole. In this way, Bonaventure's system allows him to make a stronger affirmation of the creativity of the temporal process than Whitehead's system does for it allows him to affirm the participation of the process in the pre-eminent creativity of the Trinitarian processions.

Although creativity within the universe cannot match the infinite creativity of the Father as fontalis plenitudo, nevertheless all of the creativity in the universe is a positive sharing in this absolute eternal creative act. The whole world, then, shares in the primordial creativity of the generation of the Son from the Father. In taking this perspective, we imply that there are two lines to Bonaventure's exemplarism: (1) one line moving from the world to the Son, from the embodied forms to their archetypes to the Ratio Aeterna; (2) another line moving from the world to the Father, from creativity in the world to the Trinity as dynamic process - a process in which the Word or Ratio Aeterna is being eternally generated as an eternally novel expression of the Father. In Bonaventure's vision, then, the entire universe is a vestige of the Trinity, meaning that it not only reflects the power, wisdom, and goodness of the Trinity, but shares in the Trinity's dynamic process. In addition to being a vestige of the Trinity, man is an image and thus shares more fully in the divine creativity. Man the maker, the artisan, the creator approaches more closely the divine archetype of all art and making.

Echoing Augustine, Bonaventure describes the Son as the Ars Patris (the Art of the Father) ⁴⁸⁷ Thus the Trinitarian God is seen as the Maker and Artist par excellence. It is this image of God that stands behind Bonaventure's De reductions artium ad theologiam.⁴⁸⁸ All mankind, all creativity in the universe can be traced back to the Art of the Father; for all creativity shares in this primordial creativity. Drawing his data from the everyday world of the Middle Ages, Bonaventure lists the seven mechanical arts given by Hugh of St. Victor in his Didascalicon: weaving, armor-making, agriculture, hunting, navigation, medicine, and drama.⁴⁸⁹ Every craftsman, artisan, or maker - as well as every philosopher when he forms and expresses his thought in ideas and words - shares in the Art of the Father, in the creativity of the generation of the Son. As the title of the work suggests, Bonaventure employs the classical medieval reductio, which unlike its modern counterpart does not mean a devaluation, but rather a leading back or retracing of a concrete object or activity to its ground in the divinity. When the artisan makes a product, then, he shares in the Trinitarian creativity.

Thus for Bonaventure the artisan is not merely copying archetypal forms in the divine mind; he is creating something radically new - not apart from, but along with the divine fontalis plenitudo. In one line of exemplarity, the artisan's creative idea moves back to its ideal model in the divine mind. But in another line of exemplarity, the artisan shares in the primordial fecundity of the Father. With the Father the artisan shares not only in the creation of the external object, but in the generation of the archetypes in the Son. Thus in a most profound sense the artisan shares in a novelty that transcends his own isolated activity; for his creative act participates in the eternal novelty of the divine generation.

Not only the artisan, as image of the Trinity, but also the entire universe as vestige shares in this dynamism; thus the world of matter as well as human creativity shares in the Trinitarian process:

But the seminal reasons [rationes seminales] cannot exist in matter without the generation and production of form; neither can intellectual reasons [rationes intellectuales] exist in the soul without the generation of a word in the mind. Therefore ideal reasons [rationes ideales] cannot exist in God without the generation of the Word from the Father in proper proportion. This is a mark of dignity, and if it is appropriate to the creature, how much more so can it be inferred about the Creator. It was on account of this that Augustine said that the Son of God is the "art of the Father."⁴⁹⁰

Notice the medieval reductio, with the Franciscan emphasis on the movement from the lowest to the highest, from the dynamism of matter to the dynamism of the Father. With his exemplaristic logic Bonaventure observes that if dynamism is appropriate to the creature, how much more so to the Creator. Bonaventure's thoroughgoing exemplarism is in harmony with Whitehead's statement that "in the first place, God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification."⁴⁹¹ However, when Bonaventure strives to discover in God the chief exemplification of creativity, he penetrates beyond God's external creative activity and enters into the inner life of the Trinity to discover unsurpassable creativity in the Trinitarian processions.

To place the ultimate source of creativity in the Trinity allows Bonaventure to maintain simultaneously several opposites. Man can share in the primordial work of creation, but at the same time remain dependent upon God. In Bonaventure's vision he can make the extreme Aristotelian-Thomistic affirmation of dependence, and at the same time the extreme Platonic-Augustinian exemplaristic affirmation of sharing in the divinity. Thus in man, the microcosm, the opposites join. Man is supremely creative, for he shares the supreme creativity of the fontalis plenitudo; at the same time he is supremely dependent, for ultimately he is not the fontalis plenitudo but only shares in its fullness in a limited way. Thus in man's creative activity many lines of opposites converge: transcendence and immanence, eternity and time, form and novelty.

Is there something in Bonaventure's system comparable to Whitehead's consequent nature of God, whereby God is enriched by the process? Although Bonaventure did not formulate the issue this way, I believe it is possible to do so. Creativity has two modes of manifestation - eternally within the divinity and externally within temporal creation. On the divine level within the Trinity, creativity is complete, with no limitations; it does not have, and cannot have, an absolute external manifestation within creation. Thus on the creaturely level it is open to a variety of possibilities. In God's external manifestation, then, we can discern a unique realization of God's perfection: namely, its external manifestation amid a variety of possibilities. Something new is added to the perfection of the world through the creativity actualized in time; and since the world manifests unique aspects of God, then we can say that God is enriched in his external manifestations both by his initial act of creation and by the creativity actualized within space and time by his creatures.

Of course, seen in this perspective, God's enrichment is not the same as in Whitehead's system. In Bonaventure God is saved from contingency by the fact that his creativity is eternally actualized in an absolute degree within the Trinity. Granted this, we can establish a coincidence of opposites between God and the world along the lines of Whitehead's antonomies, but without the implications of God's dependence on the world. Thus for Bonaventure, it is as true to say that the world creates God (in his external manifestations) as that God creates the world. By activating their creativity through participation, creatures bring to realization novel expressions of the ultimate, unbounded divine creativity at the heart of the Trinitarian life. Hence God is not the unmoved mover, aloof and detached, but self-communicating goodness, intent upon sharing his creativity with creatures and upon their realization of his creativity for their own and for his enrichment.

This, then, is Bonaventure's response to the problem of the divine fecundity. Through a coincidence of opposites within the divinity, he offers a solution to the problem surveyed in Lovejoy's The Great Chain of Being and which persists to this day in Western thought. It is a matter of historical significance that Bonaventure addressed himself to this problem in the thirteenth century. But it is a matter of philosophical and theological significance that he reached a solution that has much to contribute to the Great Dialogue in our time. By requiring that God be absolutely fecund, Bonaventure faced the problem squarely. By situating this absolute fecundity in the Trinity through the coincidence of opposites, he freed God from dependence on the world and the world from having to bear the impossible burden of expressing the fullness of the divine fecundity. Bonaventure's God is indeed transcendent, but not by being unrelated to the world; he is transcendent precisely because he is self-diffusive. Since his fecundity, and hence his relatedness, are actualized absolutely and eternally within the Trinity, there is a basis for his full involvement in the world. Bonaventure's God, then, is at least as dynamic and as manifesting as Hegel's God, and as involved in the creativity of the temporal process as Whitehead's God. But Bonaventure's God is freed from the ambiguities that would make him dependent on the world and enmeshed in the process. Liberated from dependence on the world, Bonaventure's God can be absolutely dynamic in his inner life; yet he does not remain wrapped up in himself, in splendid divine isolation. Quite the contrary, his transcendent dynamism is precisely the source of his further diffusion in creation. Without being overwhelmed by that dynamism, creatures share in the absolute divine creativity through participation in the eternal novelty of the generation of the Son by the Father.

God and the World

Through the coincidence of opposites Bonaventure was able to offer a profound solution to the problem of the divine fecundity: by placing absolute self-communication on the level of the divine self-sufficiency. Through another type of the coincidence of opposites - that of the infinite and the finite - he can offer a solution to another vexing problem: God's relation to the world. As Lovejoy has pointed out, those traditions that affirm God as self-sufficient absolute produce an otherworldly perspective, separating God from the world and emphasizing the dissimilarity between God and the world.⁴⁹² This image of the distant God goes counter to the sense of God's presence in the world conveyed in Biblical revelation, especially in the mystery of Christ. It is understandable, then, that the immanence of God has been emphasized by such twentieth century thinkers as Whitehead, Hartshorne, Teilhard de Chardin, Tillich, and Rahner.

It should come as no surprise to discover that Bonaventure has something to contribute to this discussion. For he was the heir and interpreter of Francis of Assisi, who expressed the greatest sense of the immanence of God in the history of Christianity. In fact, for Western culture as a whole Francis has become the symbol of the religious sense of the divine immanence. Bonaventure shared Francis' vision, seeing the presence of God throughout creation - in the lowliest of creatures and across the vast panorama of the universe. Creatures are like a mirror reflecting God, a path leading to God, a statue depicting God, a stained glass window which reflects the richness of God's fecundity. Bonaventure gave a philosophical and theological foundation to this Franciscan vision - through his doctrine of exemplarism in the Word, in whom the infinite and the finite coincide. In the twentieth century discussion over the immanence of God, it would be beneficial to listen to the chief spokesman of Francis of Assisi; for Bonaventure's theological interpretation matches in depth the intensity of Francis' religious experience.

Paradoxically, in Bonaventure's thought the very principle that accounts for God's transcendence is the root of his immanence. Bonaventure had founded God's transcendence in his fecundity, which is so great that it cannot be exhausted within the world. However, when God expresses himself in creation, he does so out of the ultimate mystery of Trinitarian fecundity. When the Father generates the Son, he generates in the Son the archetypes of all he can make. As Bonaventure says: "The Father generated one similar to himself, namely the Word, co-eternal with himself; and he expressed his own likeness and as a consequence expressed all the things that he could make."⁴⁹³ Thus the Father's fecundity which expresses itself in the Word also produces in the Word the rationes aeternae of all that can be made. These eternal reasons within the Son are the ontological ground of each individual creature. Thus Bonaventure can say that things have a threefold existence: They exist in the Eternal Art (in the Son), they exist also in matter, and they exist within the mind.⁴⁹⁴ The most important dimension of their existence is in the Eternal Art, within the Son as Image and Word of the Father. Thus creation has an eternal existence within the interior life of the Trinity; for creation, as grounded in the eternal reasons is co-eternal with the generation of the Son from the Father. There exists, then, an eternal and very intimate relationship between God and the world.⁴⁹⁵

Because all creatures have an eternal existence within the Son, creation ad extra is intimately related to God. When God freely creates ad extra, the world now has existence not only in the Eternal Art, but also in space and time. But this space-time existence does not rupture the relation between God and the world. Rather the world is intimately related to God because of its existence in the Son, through the eternal reasons which are the ontological ground of creatures. The relation between creatures and God is so intimate that Bonaventure can say: "I will see myself better in God than in my very self."⁴⁹⁶ Through their exemplaristic grounding in the Word, all creatures reflect God and lead man to God. With great precision, Bonaventure divides creatures into various levels of representing God: shadow, vestige, image, and similitude.⁴⁹⁷

Although creatures reflect God, they are not swallowed up in God as drops of water in the ocean; rather in reflecting God, their own individuality is intensified. While being intimately related to God, they remain radically themselves. Bonaventure holds that within the Word there are archetypes of each individual thing, not merely universal ideas. This is Bonaventure's way of affirming the Franciscan sense of the importance of individuality and the value of uniqueness. St. Francis had this sense to a heightened degree, and it was expressed later by Duns Scotus in his doctrine of haecceitas, or thisness, that property by which a thing is an individual. Although Scotus expressed this Franciscan sense of individuality by transforming an Aristotelian mode of thought, Bonaventure expressed the same sense through Platonic exemplarism.⁴⁹⁸

In the coincidence of opposites between God and creatures, the opposites are maintained and intensified by their coincidence. For Bonaventure all the types of the coincidence of opposites - whether in the Trinity or in the world - are opposites of mutually affirming complementarity. That means that there is real opposition: both poles remain intact and are not absorbed in the other. God is not absorbed in the world, nor the world in God. But it means also that these opposites actually coincide, that they are internally related and not merely juxtaposed externally. The opposites interpenetrate and by this interpenetration intensify their uniqueness.

God and the World in Process Thought

The coincidence of God and the world is a major theme in contemporary thought. Whitehead, Hartshorne, and the process theologians criticize the classical theological tradition for separating God and the world to such an extent that the God of Christian theology hardly seems to be the same as the God of Biblical revelation.⁴⁹⁹ It is here that Bonaventure has something pointed to say to process thinkers, for he represents an ancient and long-lived tradition in Christian theology that affirms an intimate relation between God and the world. In dealing with the history of thought, Hartshorne and the process school in general describe two forms of metaphysics: classical and neo-classical.⁵⁰⁰ The latter refers to the metaphysics of Whitehead, expressed chiefly in his book Process and Reality. Within classical metaphysics, the chief target criticized by process thinkers is classical theism, which affirms a doctrine of God's transcendence above the temporal process in such a way that he is not intimately involved in the world. In assigning absolute perfection to God, classical theism radically separates God and the world. In discussion and debate, it is usually Aristotelian-Thomism that bears the banner of classical theism, and the discussion often focuses on the Aristotelian category of relation. In the Aristotelian analysis of relation, the world is said to be related to God, but God is not related to the world. In contrast, by denying that God is absolutely immutable, neo-classical theism can affirm an intimate involvement of God in the world. However, by polarizing Aristotelian-Thomism and Whitehead, neo-classical theists often have given the impression that all classical theists prior to Whitehead made a radical separation between God and the world.

There has been an ongoing argument as to whether the neoclassical assessment of Thomism is accurate.⁵⁰¹ Is the Thomist God as unrelated to the world as the neo-classical theists claim? Added to this is another question: Has neo-classical theism accurately read the history of thought? Has all classical theism emphasized the distance between God and the world? If we examine Bonaventure's tradition in the light of the pluralism of the Middle Ages, then the answer to that question must be in the negative. Bonaventure's tradition is both ancient and long-lived; it flowed from the Greek Fathers and was a major current in both the twelfth and thirteenth century West. It affirms an intimate relationship between God and the world based on the Trinitarian nature of creation and on the Son as Image of the Father and as the divine mediating principle between the Father and the world, while remaining consubstantial with the Father. I wish to make it clear that Bonaventure's tradition is by no means identical with neo-classical theism. The way in which God is related to the world in both positions is significantly different. Bonaventure affirms a stronger position of God's transcendence than is affirmed by neo-classical theists. However, this does not mean that Bonaventure stands at the opposite end of the spectrum, in the Aristotelian camp. Quite the contrary. Bonaventure and his tradition stand at a midpoint between the two, affirming with equal vigor the immanence and the transcendence of God. Perhaps a reexamination on a broad basis of the various traditions of the Middle Ages might bring about a reinterpretation of the history of thought on the part of neo-classical theists.

As we have seen, Bonaventure's way of relating God and the world is through exemplarism, which in turn is based on expressionism. When the Father generates the Son, expressing his perfect Image and Word, he produces in the Son the archetypes of all he can make. Creation outside the Trinity is an external expression of these archetypes or "eternal reasons," which have their primary existence within the Word. Thus creation as a whole and all creatures in their radical individuality manifest the Son and reflect back to the Son. This, however, is not a weak or tenuous reflection. Quite the contrary! For the deepest reality of each creature is its eternal grounding in the archetypes in the divine mind. Thus through the archetypes in the Word, Bonaventure establishes a most intimate relation between God and the world - a relation effecting a coincidence of opposites of the infinite and the finite mediated by the Son.

This doctrine of exemplarism is a Platonic heritage, which had been given a distinctly Christian interpretation by being situated within the mystery of the Trinity. It is interesting to note that Whitehead also incorporates a major strand of Platonism into his treatment of the relation of God and the world. Whitehead builds into his system "eternal objects," which are similar to the eternal forms and ideas of Plato, and like Augustine situates these eternal objects in God.⁵⁰² However, Whitehead conceives these eternal objects as pure potentialities for the specific determination of actual entities in the world. In contrast, Bonaventure conceives the "eternal reasons" (rationes aeternae) as eminently actual and not as merely pure potentialities for actualization in creation. They are eminently actual since they exist on the divine level and possess the eminent reality of God. It is true that they are also potentialities for actualization in creation, but prior to their actualization in space-time, they have a pre-eminent actualized reality in the Son. For just as the Son is pre-eminently actualized in being generated eternally by the Father, so the eternal reasons in the Son share in this actuality.

As in the case of creativity treated above, I believe the crucial difference between Bonaventure and Whitehead lies in whether or not God is eminently real and hence eminently actual, not only in his self-sufficient being but also in his inner creativity. For Whitehead, God is not eminently real in the classical sense and hence his relation to the world makes up for his deficient actuality. For Bonaventure, God is eminently real and has his inner creativity eternally actualized in the Trinitarian processions. It is precisely this inner creativity that establishes a preeminent relation between God and the world - through the eternal reasons in the Word.

Although Bonaventure's doctrine of exemplarism establishes an intimate relation between God and the world, it seems to threaten creativity and novelty in the world. The problem again is over the eminent reality of the eternal reasons. In Whitehead's system, since the eternal objects lack eminent reality, they can be brought to actualization by the temporal process in creative novelty. On the other hand, Bonaventure's eternal reasons, possessing eminent reality and actuality, seem to lock man in a cyclic process that strips him of creativity. Although he can use his creative powers to arrive at new forms, what he discovers and produces is merely a reflection of an eternal idea that is preexistent and eminently real in the mind of God. Although man is in a process, the process is cyclic and the goal is recollection, not the creation of novelty. For all of his apparent creativity, man is merely caught in an eternal return, where he is rediscovering a blueprint that was eternally sketched in God's mind.

If, however, Bonaventure's exemplarism is situated within his Trinitarian theology, the value of creativity is not negated but affirmed in a pre-eminent way. As indicated above, there are two lines of exemplarism in Bonaventure: one moving from the world to the Son and the eternal reasons within the Son; another moving from the world to the Father, to that eternal creativity from which the Trinitarian processions spring.⁵⁰³ By following the line of exemplarism leading into the Trinity, Bonaventure breaks out of the circle of the eternal return. The pre-eminent actuality of the eternal reasons is balanced by the pre-eminent, actualized creativity of the Father. If the world participates in the mystery of the dynamic Trinity, then it shares in the unbounded creativity and the eternal novelty of the generation of the Son. This, I believe, is a stronger creativity and novelty than one finds in Whitehead's system, although it clearly involves a different metaphysical understanding of both creativity and novelty.

To return to Whitehead's position on God's relation to the world, we see that God is involved in the world in a number of ways. He is the locus of the eternal objects which are the potentialities for the actualization of actual entities; he is the principle of limitation for actual entities and the source of their subjective aim. After an actual entity achieves its novel actualization of creativity, God draws up into his consequent nature its objective realization, making it available to the ongoing process. Thus God has several levels of relatedness to the world. In Whitehead's system, the world has to achieve what the Trinity achieves for Bonaventure. In Bonaventure's system, God is eminently real, possessing pre-eminently actualized creativity and relatedness within the Trinity. For Whitehead God depends on the world for the actualization of his creativity; thus his relation to the world is bound up with his need to achieve actualization. In Bonaventure, God is eminently creative independently of the world; but because of the eminent reality of the eternal reasons, he is most intimately involved in the world. In Bonaventure's system, the eminent reality of the eternal reasons functions in a way similar to Whitehead's eternal objects and the consequent nature of God, establishing the relation between God and the world.

Unlike Whitehead, Bonaventure affirms God's immanence without threatening his transcendence. This is achieved through a more complex coincidence of opposites than one finds in White-head's system. For Bonaventure, creativity and relatedness must be actualized in God; this is a matter of necessity and not contingency, since it pertains to the divine nature itself and is not dependent on God's free choice. However, this necessary actualization of creativity and relatedness is realized not in creation but in the Trinity, through the coincidence of self-sufficiency and self-communication. This coincidence of opposites allows for the coincidence of necessity and contingency in creation. On the divine side there is absolute necessity since the divine fecundity must of necessity be eternally actualized in the Trinity. On the side of the world, there is complete contingency since the world is neither necessary nor adequate for God's self-diffusion. Yet necessity and contingency coincide in appropriateness (convenentia) since it is appropriate for God to express his inner fecundity ad extra. The Word, who is the necessary expression of the Father, is the medium of the divine free self-diffusion in creatures, the locus of the eternal reasons which link God and creatures in most intimate relation through the preeminent reality they derive from the Word. Through this complex orchestration of opposites, Bonaventure gives speculative expression to the mystery of God's fecundity and immanence which Francis experienced in such depth and simplicity.

Teilhard and Bonaventure

Teilhard's version of process thought is closer than the Whiteheadian version to Bonaventure's system. This is true not only of the issue of God's relation to the world, but of the system as a whole.⁵⁰⁴ Teilhard's vision is explicitly Trinitarian, although this aspect of his thought is not systematically developed. Except for a few isolated passages, Teilhard merely assumes the classical Christian doctrine of God; he does not make the metaphysics of God's relation to the world a central theme as Whitehead does. Unlike Whitehead's God, Teilhard's is eminently real and Trinitarian. Although Teilhard's doctrine of God is classical and hence does not introduce contingency in God, it is clearly within the fecundity tradition as identified by Lovejoy. Unlike Thomas Aquinas, for example, Teilhard does not emphasize the radical dependence of the world on God's self-sufficiency, although his notion of Omega includes this notion. Rather Teilhard emphasizes the divine involvement in the creative process of the world through God's sharing his creative energy with the universe. This energy is imparted to the evolutionary process by the cosmic Christ, present throughout the universe, drawing evolution to its culmination.⁵⁰⁵ In many respects Teilhard's cosmic Christ is similar to Bonaventure's doctrine of the Son as the medium of the divine presence and of the return of creatures to the unity of the Father. Both Bonaventure and Teilhard have a strong doctrine of Christocentricity, in contrast with the Whiteheadians, who are Godcentered. Just as for Bonaventure, the creative aspect of God and his intimate involvement in the world are articulated in Teilhard's system through his doctrine of Christ.

Teilhard's religious sensibility is not unlike that of Francis and Bonaventure. With the Franciscans, he shares a cosmic sense, an awareness of the vast sweep of creation and of the presence of God in all creatures. The divine immanence, which Bonaventure expressed through the exemplarism of the Word, Teilhard expresses through his doctrine of the cosmic Christ. As Omega of evolution, Christ is present in and energizing the entire cosmos, from the least particle of matter to the convergent human community. In his work entitled "Christ in the World of Matter," Teilhard gives several images that lead one to an awareness of Christ's presence in matter.⁵⁰⁶ Teilhard describes a picture of Christ that seems to expand and encompass the universe, a Host whose whiteness penetrates to the center of all particles of matter. He suggests that the world is a crystal lamp illumined from within by the light of Christ. The image of the glowing crystal lamp illustrates graphically a central term in Teilhard: "diaphany", meaning from its Greek roots "to appear through." In Teilhard this term refers to the appearing of God through matter, to the shining of Christ through the cosmos. For those who can see, Christ shines in a diaphany, through the cosmos and in matter.

The diaphany of Christ is no mere static self-revelation. Christ is present in his power; he is dynamic and transforming. He imparts energy which brings matter to its fulfillment: ". . . under the influence of this inner light which penetrated it, its fibres were stretched to breaking-point and all the energies within them were strained to the utmost."⁵⁰⁷ In the minute particles within the atom, Christ is present and his energy is driving matter to its evolutionary goal in the process of Christogenesis: ". . . Christ himself does not act as a dead or passive point of convergence, but as a centre of radiation for the energies which lead the universe back to God through his humanity."⁵⁰⁸ The whole cosmic process is seen as a working out of the Incarnation and an extension of the Eucharist: the coming to be of Christ, the growth of Christ in the universe.

Teilhard's Christocentric cosmic mysticism is linked with a specific cosmology, which is an integration of his scientific studies and his religious faith. Like Whitehead, Teilhard is concerned with a cosmology that includes both a creative advance and the divine immanence. Whereas Teilhard's cosmos is evolutionary, moving in progressive stages of development towards the goal which he calls Omega, Whitehead's is processive, but not progressive. Teilhard sees the entire universe in a process of evolution, moving from matter to spirit. This process goes through successive states: First, particles of matter unite to form more complex units until life appears on the earth. Within the biosphere, or sphere of living things, the process of complexification continues until man appears and with him the noosphere or sphere of mind. Evolution continues within the noosphere, with the development of consciousness and the complexification of the human community. The whole process moves towards greater interiorization, to greater consciousness, to greater union in love. This tendency is found from the atom to man - from the cluster of atoms in a molecule to the uniting of men in a world community. All of this is effected by the action of Omega, or Christ, at every point of the way - on the center of the atom and on the center of the human person - bringing each to a greater union that interiorizes, individualizes, and thus leads to new possibilities: to an ultimate hominization and Christification of the cosmos. Thus the process of evolution is seen as a Christogenesis, or a coming to be of Christ.⁵⁰⁹

It would be out of the question to compare Teilhard and Bonaventure point for point in their cosmological views. The thirteenth century lacked the scientific knowledge, the historical data, and the sense of process that are part of the twentieth century experience. Medieval man lived in a Ptolemaic universe, composed of concentric spheres which moved the planets and stars. The universe was hierarchically structured with the earth at the center, then the moon, then the planets and the sun, then the crystalline heaven, and finally the empyrean. The material universe was composed of four elements: earth, air, fire, and water. Animal species were created by God in the beginning and remained basically fixed. The same was true of man. There was change and development in history - as the Incarnation and redemption attested - but the full import of this was not consciously grasped. The Copernican revolution, the development of science, the emergence of history in the nineteenth century were all to contribute to the change from the medieval world view to that of the twentieth century.

Bonaventure's cosmology differs vastly from that of the twentieth century - and from Teilhard's in particular. And yet Bonaventure's thought has a dynamic quality that is not incompatible with the process and evolution in Teilhard. On the theological and philosophical level, Bonaventure's thought is dynamic - open to novelty and development. This dynamic quality comes to the fore at key points of his system and overflows the structure of his medieval universe.

One can see more than a morphological similarity between Bonaventure and Teilhard, for the Franciscan tradition played a significant role in shaping the development of science in Western culture. Interest in the material world was typical of the Franciscan spirit. It permeated both spirituality and intellectual inquiry. By their concern for observation and experimentation, the Franciscan thinkers of the Middle Ages were the forerunners of modern empirical science. It is not surprising, then, that out of the empirical scientific tradition, there should arise a man like Teilhard, who discovers in the material world the very diaphany of Christ that inspired the medieval Franciscans to explore the world of matter.

Christ the Center

A dialogue between Bonaventure and Teilhard on cosmic Christocentricity would be very fruitful. Once again the coincidence of opposites provides the means of contact, this time through the coincidence of opposites at the center of the mandala. As we observed in the development of Bonaventure's thought, cosmic Christocentricity emerged late and did not reach a self-reflective articulation. In Teilhard's case, cosmic Christocentricity was prominent even in his early period and was developed extensively throughout his life. Whereas Bonaventure linked Christ the center with exemplarism, Teilhard linked Christ the center with evolution. For Teilhard Christ is the center of evolution in the sense that the energies of the process are centered on Christ as Omega of evolution. We can find abundant evidence that in Teilhard's thought Christ functions as the center of a cosmic mandala. Like Bonaventure's works, Teilhard's abound in mandala symbols. In the Itinerarium the soul proceeds on a journey which is in a mandala design with Christ as the center; in The Phenomenon of Man Teilhard describes a cosmic journey which has a similar mandala pattern, also with Christ as the center.⁵¹⁰

In the Itinerarium, Bonaventure describes the concrete stages in the soul's evolution to God: through the material world, sense knowledge, its natural faculties, as enlightened by grace, through knowledge of God as one and Triune, and finally in mystical ecstasy. The journey involves a process of interiorization from the outer to the inner to the above - to union with God. Love is the driving force: the journey begins in desire and ends in union.

If we shift the center of focus from the individual soul to the entire cosmic process, we can glimpse the outline of Teilhard's Phenomenon of Man. In Teilhard's view the entire cosmos is on a journey to God - in a process of divinization which Teilhard calls Christogenesis. This involves stages similar to Bonaventure's: the material world, sensitive life, man and his further development towards the Omega. The divinization takes place through interiorization, from the without to the within to the Omega. Love is the force that energizes the process, leading to progressive union with Christ Omega.

In each case, Christ the center of the mandala activates the journey of the soul and the evolution of the universe. In both systems, Christ functions as the coincidence of cosmological opposites: the creator and the creature, divinity and matter. But he also functions as the cosmic center in whom all the opposites of the universe are centered and coincide. Thus as center of the mandala, Christ brings together the unity and diversity of creation. Christ is also the dynamic center, drawing both the human soul and the universe through the stages of a journey into union with the Father. In Teilhard, the Christocentric cosmic mandala requires the evolutionary process which he derived from his scientific research. This is a controversial aspect of Teilhard's system and one not shared by Bonaventure's medieval cosmology. Thus although there are interesting parallels in the two systems, there are important differences. It would be illuminating to make a detailed study of the way in which Christ the center affects the very structure and dynamics of the universe in each system.

At this point Bonaventure can enter into a larger dialogue that involves not only theologians, but secular culture as well. This is the dialogue over the future, which deals with such questions as: What is the relation of God to time? Of Christ to time? What is the theological meaning of the future? What roles does eschatology play in the Christian vision? This issue has arisen sharply both from theology itself and from secular culture. Biblical research over the twentieth century has drawn into focus the centrality of salvation history and of eschatology in the Christian vision. In secular culture the forces of change have accelerated so rapidly in the last ten years that modern man is bewildered and numbed by "future shock." On the horizon he sees a pending ecological crisis and the threat of nuclear destruction; at the same time advances in science and technology augur a creative, utopia-like future.

These issues were explored in a conference held in 1971 in New York City, with such theologians as Pannenberg, Moltmann, Metz, Cobb, Ogden, Mooney, and Hefner. The theme of the conference was Hope and the Future of Man, and it drew together in dialogue three strands of contemporary theology seriously concerned with the future: American process theologians, Teilhardians, and theologians of hope.⁵¹¹ The discussion centered on alternate models of the future: How did each group conceive the future, and what basis of hope did it discern? Underlying many of the points discussed lay the basic issues of Christocentricity: What relation, if any, does Christ have to the structure of the universe and to time? Does the mystery of Christ, as Teilhard holds, have a physical effect upon the universe and direct the forces of evolution towards a successful outcome? Or is the cosmological structure more God-centered, as the process theologians maintain, with the result that the future is less affected by the mystery of Christ? From another perspective, is the mystery of Christ to be situated in the realm of history and not nature, as some eschatological theologians hold, liberating man from oppression rather than activating a cosmic process of growth?

At this point of the dialogue Bonaventure would have much to contribute. As one of the major articulators of Christocentricity in the history of theology, Bonaventure can enter the contemporary dialogue to clarify issues and to contribute towards solutions even in the highly-accelerated time world of the twentieth century. From a historical point of view, it is important to have Bonaventure's position recognized in the present discussion. For he came at a time when both Christocentricity and eschatology reached a new level of consciousness in Western culture. Francis' Christocentricity and Joachite eschatological consciousness were not only present in Bonaventure, but were synthesized within his system. Once again the key to this synthesis was the coincidence of opposites. Like many of his medieval contemporaries, Bonaventure had a heightened future-awareness; he was oriented to the age-to-come. But this did not erase Christ from the center of history. Thfough his Trinitarian model of Christ the middle person (persona media) of the Trinity, he was able to anchor his eschatological consciousness in Christ as the center of history. And through his Franciscan sense of the divine presence in the universe, he was able to see Christ as the center of the universe. Thus Christ is simultaneously the center of the universe and the center of history. What does this mean for secular culture? For hope for the future? Does it lead inevitably to Teilhard's position: that matter evolves towards spirit and ultimately toward Omega? Does it mean that the temporal process will contribute to the spiritual eschaton and that on the temporal level the process will have a successful outcome? These are indeed crucial questions. Although Bonaventure may not be able to give final answers, he does offer a resource whose richness cannot wisely be ignored at the present critical moment.

TlLLICH AND RAHNER

Bonaventure can also enter into dialogue with the systems of Paul Tillich and Karl Rahner. There is a striking similarity on the general structural level among the systems of these three thinkers. This can be accounted for by the fact that all three give different expressions to the same generic Christian Neo-Platonic tradition which we identified in our first chapter. Although Rahner has been influenced in many ways by Thomism, his Trinitarian theology is self-consciously derived from the Greek Fathers. As in Tillich's thought, the Trinity provides the chief structural design of his system. Tillich's system emerges out of the tradition of German romanticism, which gives its own expression - often problematically - to Trinitarian themes of the Christian Neo-Platonic tradition. An in-depth analysis of Tillich's thought will show that his treatment of man and the human situation reflects the Trinitarian vestige and image tradition which Bonaventure shares from common Augustinian roots.⁵¹² Since Bonaventure is the major representative of the Christian Neo-Platonic tradition in the high Middle Ages, it would be most enlightening to draw him into dialogue with two twentieth-century representatives of the same tradition.

For our present purposes, however, we wish to establish the dialogue not on the general Trinitarian structural level but on the issue of man's knowledge of God in subjectivity.⁵¹³ This is a major theme in twentieth century theology and one of the most experiential ways of encountering the coincidence of opposites. For man grasps within the finite structures of human subjectivity the presence of God as the unconditional ground of Being (Tillich) and the 'Whither' of transcendence (Rahner). Thus human subjectivity is the locus of the coincidence of the finite and the infinite. This approach to God through subjectivity was explored in a classical fashion by Augustine and has become associated with the mainstream Augustinian tradition in Western culture. In the case of Rahner, Tillich, and Bonaventure, this approach through subjectivity is integrated into the larger Trinitarian design of their systems.

Tillich was aware of Bonaventure's position and made the claim that his own thought was in continuity with the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition. In his important essay "The Two Types of the Philosophy of Religion," he refers specifically to Bonaventure:

The Franciscan school of 13th century scholasticism, represented by Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and Matthew of Aquasparta developed the Augustinian solution into a doctrine of the principles of theology, and maintained, in spite of some Aristotelian influences, the ontological type of philosophy of religion. Their whole emphasis was on the immediacy of the knowledge of God. According to Bonaventure, "God is most truly present to the very soul and immediately knowable"; He is knowable in Himself without media as the one which is common to all. For He is the principle of knowledge, the first truth, in the light of which everything else is known, as Matthew says.⁵¹⁴

Tillich proceeds to develop his own position in continuity with Bonaventure and the early Franciscan tradition. He gives his formulation of the principle that underlies this approach: "Man is immediately aware of something unconditional which is the prius of the separation and the interaction of subject and object, theoretically as well as practically."⁵¹⁵ In the light of this principle Tillich develops his own doctrine of man's knowledge of God, of symbolic expressions of God, and of ontological certainty and the risk of faith. At this point it would be important to bring Bonaventure into dialogue with Tillich in order to clarify issues and to situate Tillich in the proper historical context. Tillich has been under attack by critics from two camps - the Barthian and the Neo-Thomist - who criticize him from the presuppositions of their own positions. In many instances Tillich's statements are misread, for they are viewed from an alien perspective and not in the light of the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition in which he himself intended them to be viewed. It would be an enormous contribution to Tillich scholarship if he could be situated within the Bonaventurian tradition. This is not to say that Tillich's thought is identical with Bonaventure's. In fact, some of the most penetrating criticisms of Tillich can be leveled precisely from within the Bonaventurian tradition. But a balanced evaluation of Tillich and his contribution to the twentieth century must await a full-scale investigation of the Bonaventurian tradition and its relevance to issues of the twentieth century.⁵¹⁶

Like Tillich, Karl Rahner approaches God through human subjectivity. Whereas Tillich moves within the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition, Rahner takes his point of departure from the Transcendental Thomism of Joseph Marechal.⁵¹⁷ Situating itself within the Kantian critique, this Transcendental Thomism turns to subjectivity, where it finds an approach to God in the dynamism of the spirit towards the Infinite. In man's search for knowledge, we discern within the horizon of consciousness an openness to God, whom Rahner calls the 'Whither' of transcendence:

We may fittingly suppose that man in his knowing and willing is a being of absolute and unlimited transcendence. All his spiritual acts, no matter what their object, are founded on this transcendence, which is a reaching forward of knowledge and will. ... It is also obvious that the most primordial, underivative knowledge of God, which is the basis of all other knowledge of God, is given in the experience of transcendence, in so far as it contains, implicitly and unobjectivated, but irrecusably and inevitably, the 'Whither' of transcendence, which we call God.⁵¹⁸

Although formulated in the context of the Kantian critique, Transcendental Thomism has roots in the Augustinian tradition.

It would be illuminating to explore these Augustinian roots by drawing Bonaventure into dialogue with Transcendental Thomism, since he is the chief witness in the high Middle Ages of the Augustinian approach to God through subjectivity. As we have seen previously, he extensively explored the Augustinian position in key texts in the Itinerarinm, in the disputed questions De scientia Christi and De mysterio Trinitatis and in the sermon Christus unus omnium magister.⁵¹⁹ Such a dialogue with Bonaventure would have several advantages: It could clarify the epistemological issues, helping to sort out the distinctive Aristotelian and Augustinian elements in Transcendental Thomism. It would help relate Rahner and Tillich, thus clarifying the development of twentieth century theology. And it could throw light on the Transcendental Thomist interpretation of Thomas and on the movement of thought in the thirteenth century.

It is generally accepted that there was a major shift of consciousness in the thirteenth century as a result of the influx of Aristotelian philosophy. The earlier Augustinian way of subjectivity was supplanted by the outer way of empiricism, with the point of departure taken from the sense world. Thomas' epistemology is clearly rooted in the sense world and proceeds through the Aristotelian doctrine of abstraction. How much of the Augustinian epistemology does Thomas retain? This is a complex question and one that has been raised by the work of the Transcendental Thomists in the twentieth century: Marechal, Rahner, and Lonergan. Over the past fifty years all three men have engaged in major interpretations of texts of Thomas.⁵²⁰ Remaining within Thomas' generic Aristotelian-empirical orientation, they nevertheless discovered a dimension of subjectivity which opens up to the religious sphere. I am inclined to believe that their interpretation of Thomas has the support of the historical context. If the awareness of subjectivity constituted so deep a current in medieval culture, as the evidence drawn from Bonaventure indicates, then there is reason to expect that a dimension of subjectivity could be retained even with a shift of consciousness.

Since Transcendental Thomists have taken their point of departure from the Kantian critique, they run the risk of "reading into" the texts of Thomas a notion of subjectivity that is modern. However, one could take a medieval point of departure - from the Augustinian-Bonaventurian tradition - and arrive at the Transcendental Thomist position. Such an approach would proceed from the Augustinian-Bonaventurian awareness of the reflection of God as absolute Truth and absolute Good within the human spirit. This coincidence of God and the spirit is dynamic, drawing man to absolute Truth in all finite truths and to absolute Good in all finite goods. Open to this transcendent horizon, then, the human spirit in its very quest for knowledge would be seen as involved in a dynamic process of self-transcending striving towards the Good. And, of course, for Bonaventure the Good could not existentially draw man's spirit towards it unless it were already present deep within him as a coincidence of opposites - though at first with a veiled and not yet recognized presence. This transcendent horizon of the spirit's drive towards being, both as true and as good, is the clearly recognizable ancestor of Transcendental Thomism's "dynamism of the spirit towards the Infinite" (Marechal, Rahner) and the "unrestricted drive to know" (Lonergan).

The claim of the Transcendental Thomists to have discovered a subjective dimension in Thomas calls for a serious restudying of the role of subjectivity in the thirteenth century - against the background of the Augustinian-Bonaventurian tradition.⁵²¹ There is work to be done in clarifying the precise relation of the alleged subjective dimension in Thomas with the subjectivity traditions that preceded him. Such an enterprise would involve serious collaboration among intellectual historians, Transcendental Thomists and Augustinian-Bonaventurian subjectivists. Such an exploration could lead to a significant re-interpretation of subjectivity in the thirteenth century and a significant reassessment of the thought of Thomas in the light of the Bonaventurian tradition.

Although twentieth century man stands at a far remove from Bonaventure's medieval world, he can find in the Franciscan's thought a rich resource for dealing with crucial issues of our time. It is true that Bonaventure's Ptolemaic universe has been transformed by successive scientific revolutions - from Copernicus to Newton, Darwin, and Einstein. Yet the basic questions of God's relation to the universe remain, whether these be posed in terms of the new physics, as in Whitehead, or in the evolutionary perspective of Teilhard. The religious eschatology of the Middle Ages has been recast into secular concerns by liberation theology. And the journey into subjectivity, which Augustine opened for medieval man, must now encompass territory charted by Freud and the existentialists. Yet in all these areas Bonaventure has something to contribute - not merely in a generic way as a major philosopher and theologian, but in the sense that his specific concerns touch the heart of contemporary issues. His doctrine of the dynamic God, of the processive universe and of the path through subjectivity all have a contemporary ring. And in each area the coincidence of opposites illumines both the depth of his vision and its point of contact with twentieth century concerns.

These same resources, which Bonaventure offers, can come to the aid of the twentieth century Christian as he attempts to relate in a new way to the diverse strands of the Christian tradition and to the religions of the world. Although Bonaventure lived in the enclosed Christian world of medieval Europe, his Franciscan cosmic sense and love of diversity can help modern man in dealing with the religious pluralism of our time. As we will see in the following chapter, Bonaventure has significant contributions to make both to Christian unity and to the dialogue of world religions.

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