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CHAPTER VII

Types and Implications of the Coincidence of Opposites

In the notion of Christ the center the coincidence of opposites in Bonaventure's thought reaches its climax. From the perspective of Christ the center, then, we can draw together the various types of the coincidence of opposites which we have studied in different texts and from different points of view; we can see their variety and at the same time discern how they participate in a complex unity. With this clarification, we can relate Bonaventure's vision to the three classes of unity and difference which we presented in the first chapter. From the vantage point of this overarching hermeneutical framework, we can explore the implications of Bonaventure's coincidence of opposites for situating him within the history of thought. If, as I have claimed, the coincidence of opposites is the key for understanding Bonaventure's thought, then it would also be the key for relating him to his predecessors and contemporaries, for clarifying his position in the controversies of the thirteenth century and for relating him to the subsequent history of thought.

In drawing together the various types of the coincidence of opposites, we will review the evidence for my basic claim in this book: namely, that the coincidence of opposites is the indigenous logic of Bonaventure's system in its entirety and in all of its major parts. I hope that by this time this claim is substantiated both by an analysis of key texts and by the systematic study of Bonaventure's thought. In the course of our analysis, we studied Bonaventure's thought both structurally and genetically. From the beginning of his writing career, the coincidence of opposites was implicit in the structure of his thought, especially in its Trinitarian and exemplaristic pole. In his Christological pole the basic elements of the coincidence of opposites were present at the outset, but only gradually emerged into prominence and self-consciousness in the course of his writings. The pivotal work is the Itinerarium, in which Christocentricity comes to the fore along with a consciousness of the coincidence of opposites in the spheres of the divine nature, its relation to creation, the Trinity, Christology, and the spiritual ascent. However, the full realization of Christocentricity, in the notion of Christ the medium in which all opposites coincide, does not emerge until the final period in the Collationes in Hexaemeron. Yet even here the coincidence of opposites does not reach the full abstract self-consciousness as a specific logic in the way it did in Nicholas of Cusa. It is this self-consciousness of the coincidence of opposites that I have tried to draw out of Bonaventure's system.

Five Classes of the Coincidence of Opposites

In the process of bringing Bonaventure's coincidence of opposites to self-reflective consciousness, we discovered that there is not one uniform type of the coincidence of opposites that permeates his thought. Quite the contrary! Each area of his thought contains a specific type of the coincidence of opposites based on the specific metaphysical status of that area. For example, within the Godhead, there is a coincidence of the non-manifesting and the manifesting aspects of the divinity. Within the manifesting aspect of the divinity, there is the coincidence of the dynamic opposites of the Trinity: in the Father's self-expression in the Son and the return through the Son in the unity of the Spirit. The dynamic emanation within the Trinity provides the basis for the coincidence of unity and plurality, for the persons of the Trinity coexist in the unity of the divine nature.

These opposites within the Godhead are eternal and necessary, since they are part of the very being of God. This means that within the divinity, there is the coincidence of silence and speech, of darkness and light, of simplicity and fecundity, of the ground and of emanation, of self-sufficiency and self-communication, of unity and plurality. This differentiation and polarity within the divinity is not based on creatures: on either a necessary emanation of creatures from the divine nature or on God's freewill decision to create. Even if there were no creatures, this polarity would exist, for it is bound up with the divine mystery itself. It follows, then, that it is of paramount importance to be conscious of the coincidence of opposites within the divinity, for the Christian mystery of the Trinity implies that there is a coincidence of opposites in God, independently of creatures. Because of what has been revealed to the Christian community, God cannot be seen merely as the timeless Absolute, the undivided One, or Pure Act. Of course, God is all of these - but also more! For he is the self-diffusive Good, the dynamic Trinity: the one divine nature in three divine persons.

The next class of the coincidence of opposites involves God and creation. Here we find the coincidence of the creator and the creature, the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the temporal, the beginning and the end. This necessarily involves another generic class because the elements here constitute a different metaphysical configuration from those of the first class, mentioned immediately above. In the first class, we dealt exclusively with the divinity and found there, independently of creation, several specific types of the coincidence of opposites. In this second class, we add to the divinity the realm of creation, which stands on a different metaphysical level; and in so doing, we constitute a different generic class of the coincidence of opposites.

In Bonaventure the same medium that links the divinity and creation also links the two classes of the coincidence of opposites: namely, Christ as medium metaphysicum and the persona media of the Trinity. For Bonaventure, Christ is the medium metaphysicum in his eternal generation. When the Father generates the Son, he produces in the Son the rationes aeternae of all that he can make; thus all creatures have an eternal existence in the Son as the Art of the Father. The two metaphysical spheres - the divinity and creation, the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the temporal - are united in and through Christ the medium metaphysicum in his eternal generation as the Son and Word of the Father. Not only does Christ link the two metaphysical spheres, but he also links the specific types of the coincidence of opposites within each class. In the divinity Christ is the persona media of the Trinity because as Word he is the center of the dynamic opposites of the Trinity. Yet precisely because he is the persona media in the divine sphere, he is the medium metaphysicum linking the divine sphere with the sphere of creation. Through Christ as medium metaphysicum this second class is constituted as the class of exemplarism, in which creatures reflect their divine Exemplar in various types of the coincidence of opposites graded in a hierarchical pattern: as shadow, vestige, image, and similitude. Based on exemplarism, Bonaventure's epistemology of illumination involves a coincidence of opposites in all certain knowledge through the "contuition" of the changeable, concrete finite particular and the unchangeable rationes aeternae.

The third class of the coincidence of opposites is constituted by Christ as medium physicum in his incarnation. As in the second class, we have here the coincidence of the creator and the creature, the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the temporal, the beginning and the end. But what constitutes the difference is the Incarnation. Whereas in exemplarism all creation is united to the divinity through the Word, in the Incarnation the Word is hypo-statically united to human nature in such a way as to constitute a single person. This establishes a much more intimate and complex union of the divinity and creation than was realized in universal exemplarism. It also introduces a new cluster of the coincidence of opposites which can be called the specifically Christological or Incarnational opposites to distinguish them from the coincidence of opposites in exemplarism.

In Chapter Five we saw that the Christological opposites are based on the hypostatic union and involve three types of the coincidence of opposites which I have termed cosmological since they deal with dimensions and aspects of the cosmos. This first is the maximum-minimum because in Christ the highest is joined to the lowest, the divinity with creation, even with matter. The second is the microcosm-macrocosm; for the Incarnation takes place in man who is the microcosm reflecting the macrocosm of all creation, since he combines within his nature both matter and spirit, thus reflecting all the grades of material creation and the angels as well. The combination of the maximum-minimum and microcosm-macrocosm constitutes the third type of cosmological coincidence of opposites: namely, Alpha-Omega. The union of the maximum (divine nature) in the microcosm (human nature) establishes in Christ the greatest intensity of perfection in the universe, recapitulating in himself all creation and at the same time bringing it into a new and more intimate union with the divinity. Thus Christ is the pinnacle of creation, the Alpha and Omega of the entire cosmos, the firstborn of all creatures and the goal towards which all are striving. Together these three types of the coincidence of opposites form the complex notion of Christ the center, which is the culmination of all Bonaventure's forms of the coincidence of opposites. As maximum-minimum, microcosm-macrocosm and Alpha-Omega, Christ stands at the center of the universe, uniting the opposites of matter and divinity through human nature the microcosm. Thus Christ is established as the center to which all the universe is related and through which it will realize its goal. In this way Christ becomes the center of the Christian mandala, which is at the same time a cosmogram, a psychogram, and an itinerary of the return of all things to the Father.

The fourth class of the coincidence of opposites is based on the metaphysical difference between good and evil and is concerned with sin and redemption. In my study of Bonaventure's Christology, I have called these soteriological opposites and have explored them from the standpoint of Bonaventure's notion of Christ the medium mathematicum and medium logicum. Sin introduces into the world an entirely new sphere of the coincidence of opposites: with its own power, structure, and logic. Instead of being related in a harmonious balance of complementarity, like the cosmological opposites, good and evil are contraries, constantly at war one with the other. Evil is the negation of good; it distorts good, deludes, seduces, and deceives. It promises life and brings death; it offers fulfillment and ends in destruction. In fact, it inverts and upturns all the creative power and inner logic of the good. Evil turns the creativity of the good into destruction, the truth of the good into deception. When man sinned, he upset the order of the good with its creative power and harmony and turned these to their opposite: creativity to destruction, truth to deception, reward to punishment, the positive logic of the good to the negative logic of evil.

Into this sinful world, with its distortion of the good, the Godman came to redeem man from the destructive opposites of evil. Within Bonaventure's Christology, the cosmological opposites in the God-man effect the soteriological opposites. The positive opposites of the God-man confront the negative opposites of evil and transform them into their opposites; namely the good. As medium mathematicum Christ enters into the depths of the universe and as medium logicum he transforms the logic of evil into its opposite; out of death he brings life, deceiving the deceiver to re-establish truth. Bonaventure incorporates Anselm's satisfaction theory into his soteriology and throws new light on its meaning through his logic of the coincidence of opposites. Anselm's entire theory of the redemption can be seen as an application of the logic of opposites: sin involves an infinite offense effected by finite man. This infinite offense establishes a debt which man cannot remove; it is necessary for a new coincidence of opposites to enter the universe - the God-man who by accepting the punishment for sin can unite the shattered poles and restore harmony in the universe. This is done, according to Bonaventure, by Christ's accepting the logic of evil. Christ enters into a dispute with Satan, taking upon himself the destructive logic of evil. Because he is the God-man, containing within himself all the opposites of the incarnational class - maximum-minimum, microcosm-macrocosm, Alpha-Omega, and universal center - he is able to win a victory over Satan and his destructive logic. By following the logic of evil through suffering and death, he is able to transform death into life through his resurrection. Thus he is the medium logicum in his resurrection, transforming the entire sphere of evil, along with its logic of destruction, into its opposite.

The fifth class of the coincidence of opposites concerns the return of all things to the Father and deals with Bonaventure's mystical theology and his theology of history. Bonaventure treats this return through the notion of Christ the medium ethicum, politicum, and theologicum, and through Christ the spouse of the soul and the greatest coincidence of opposites who leads to the passage of the soul into mystical ecstasy. The return of the soul is based on the fact that the soul is the image of God: a coincidence of the finite and the infinite. Through sin the soul is turned away from its Archetype, but is restored by the incarnate Word and his work of redemption. As medium mathematicum Christ restores the lost center of the soul through two perpendicular lines intersecting in the form of a cross. Once the soteriological opposites of evil have been transformed by the cosmological opposites of the Word incarnate, the soul with Christ as its center can grow as image of God in the moral and theological virtues and through infused contemplation to mystical ecstasy. Even in ecstasy and in the beatific vision, the soul is not absorbed into an undifferentiated unity with the divinity. The coincidence of opposites remains to the end of time and through eternity; for the more intimate the union of the soul with God, the more its uniqueness is intensified.

Not only does the soul return to its Archetype, but all of creation and history are on a journey back to their divine source. As medium metaphysicum, the eternal Word is both the Alpha and the Omega of the exitus and reditus of creatures. All things emanate through him in the act of creation, and all things refer back to him through exemplarism. In him all creatures find the coincidence of their beginning and their end. As we indicated, the incarnate Christ is also the Alpha and the Omega of creation, because he is the universal center of the cosmos through the complex interrelation of the maximum-minimum and the microcosm-macrocosm. In a special way Christ is the center of history and its final consummation. Through the notion of Christ the center of history Bonaventure combines the two poles of his theology - the Trinitarian and the Christocentric - thus avoiding the heresy of the Joachites, whereby the age of the Spirit supersedes that of the Son to the point of challenging the centrality of Christ in salvation history. Since Christ is the persona media of the Trinity, he remains the center of the historical process. Just as the totality of creation as vestige reflects the total Trinity, with the Word as persona media, so does salvation history reflect the integral Trinity, with the Word incarnate at its center. Thus the opposites of the eternal Trinity and the temporal process are linked in the single persona media, with the culmination of the historical process partaking of the coincidence of opposites that is at the heart of the Trinitarian life.

Christ the 'Medium' Links the Five Classes

These five classes of the coincidence of opposites, which are differentiated by the different metaphysical elements in each class, have a single unifying factor in the notion of Christ the medium, or center. As we have pointed out, the notion of Christ the medium functions differently in each class according to the metaphysical differences involved. For example, in the Trinity he is the persona media, at the center of the dynamic Trinitarian life. As incarnate Word he is the medium physicum, summing up in himself the opposite poles of reality. Thus the notion of Christ the center unifies the classes of opposites while maintaining their differences. Throughout this book I have claimed that although the coincidence of opposites is the universal logic of Bonaventure's system, each major area of his thought has its own specific form of the coincidence of opposites based on the metaphysical structure of that area. The notion of Christ the center, then, accounts for the common logic at the same time that it sustains the specific difference of each class.

The notion of Christ the medium not only provides a unifying thread running through the five classes of opposites; it also designates the specific form of the coincidence of opposites that operates in all of the classes. In the first chapter I sketched three architectonic models of the coincidence of opposites, indicating that only one of these merits the full meaning of the coincidence of opposites: namely, the model of unity and difference, in which opposites coincide through mutually affirming complementarity.⁴³¹ In this model the opposites are differentiated and united in such a way that their very coincidence intensifies their differences. Bonaventure's notion of Christ the medium implies that Christ is the center in which opposites converge and are maintained. For example, in the Trinity he is the persona media, eternally the center of the Father and the Spirit. In the Incarnation, the divine and the human natures are united in the person of the Word in such a way that the identity of each is maintained. The divinity does not swallow up the humanity, nor does the humanity contract the divinity to the point of losing itself in finitude. Yet both are genuinely united, not merely juxtaposed. In each of the above cases there is a coincidence of mutually affirming complementarity. In neither case does Bonaventure's coincidence of opposites slide into an all-consuming unity nor polarize itself into a radical separation. Thus through his notion of Christ the medium each class of Bonaventure's system is clearly situated within the architectonic model of complementarity and avoids being drawn into the other two architectonic models: either the model of non-differentiated unity in which opposites coincide to the point of losing their opposition, or the model of polarized differentiation in which no genuine coincidence occurs. Thus in each of the five classes unity and difference are maintained in mutually affirming complementarity through the notion of Christ the medium, applied consistently to each class according to the metaphysical differences of that class.

It is necessary to make certain precisions in the case of the fourth class, which is based on the metaphysical differences between good and evil. Good and evil are not related according to the coincidence of complementarity. They are contraries and uniquely related, embodying aspects of all three architectonic models. From one point of view good and evil are related as radical opposites since they struggle against each other. On the other hand, evil disguises itself as good and attempts to slip into the architectonic model of undifferentiated unity. From another perspective, good and evil are related by way of unity and difference, since evil is the negation of the good, its negative image retaining some of the power and attractiveness of the good. However, what evil lacks is the positive aspect required to enter into a creative coincidence of complementarity with the good. This raises the interesting suggestion that what makes evil evil is precisely the fact that it is a false coincidence of opposites. Hence the redemption from evil is brought about by the God-man, who is the greatest realization of the true coincidence of opposites. By entering into the false logic of evil, Christ can plunge to the roots of its distortion of the coincidence of opposites and overcome the distortion precisely by transforming it into its opposite. Even in this fourth class, then, the notion of Christ as model of the coincidence of complementarity still holds; for it is precisely because he is the persona media of the Trinity and the God-man that he can effectively enter into the false logic of evil and transform it into good.

Bonaventure and the History of Thought

Having clarified the five classes of the coincidence of opposites in Bonaventure and having related them by way of the notion of Christ the medium to the architectonic model of complementarity, we can now use this interpretation to relate Bonaventure to the history of thought. In the first chapter I made the claim that Bonaventure does not stand alone but belongs to a major current of Western thought which can be called the Christian Neo-Platonic tradition. This current flowed through the Greek Fathers, the Pseudo-Dionysius, Anselm, the Victorines, Alexander of Hales, and Bonaventure. Although eclipsed by the rediscovery of Aristotle, it continued in Nicholas of Cusa and the Platonists of the Renaissance. It emerged again in German romanticism and has manifested itself in a number of currents in the twentieth century. Although this is not a uniform tradition and is often unaware of its historical continuity, I believe that there are sufficient grounds for considering it in a generic way a unified current. I further claimed that, just as in Bonaventure's case, this entire current belongs to the architectonic model of unity and difference of complementarity and that its indigenous logic is that of the coincidence of opposites. In the light of this interpretation and in the light of the coincidence of opposites we have just studied, I will attempt to relate Bonaventure to the history of thought, chiefly to thinkers within this current. To do this adequately would be a monumental task since I would have to establish these points in the case of many thinkers with the same painstaking analysis of texts I have attempted with Bonaventure. Then I would have to do a detailed comparison of each thinker with Bonaventure in all major areas. Realizing, then, the limitation of what will follow, I will simply attempt to give some indications of the implications of our study of the coincidence of opposites for the history of thought. Perhaps at a later date I will have the opportunity to deal with some of the specific thinkers more adequately through a critical textual analysis which hopefully would substantiate my general theory.

In relating Bonaventure to the history of thought, the first strategic move is to read his system on its own terms, with its own internal optic and logic. This we have attempted to do through the coincidence of opposites. The next strategic move is to retain this perspective in relating him to the history of thought, both to his own tradition and to other traditions. It is this that we will attempt to do in the remainder of the book. I believe that considerable clarification can result from this procedure, since for many reasons the distinctive elements in Bonaventure's tradition have been obscured both in the Middle Ages and in the twentieth century. I realize that if we relate Bonaventure to the history of thought from his own perspective, we have not said the last word and closed the case. The history of thought is multidimensional and must be interpreted from many different perspectives. We cannot merely assume that Bonaventure's system is valid or that it is the most adequate that has been achieved or that can be achieved by the human mind. In brief, we cannot assume that Bonaventure, or his tradition for that matter, has said the last word. Bonaventure must be seen and judged also from the perspective of other thinkers and other traditions. And he must be drawn as an active participant into that great dialogue which through the centuries has engaged thinkers to test and establish the validity of their positions. We cannot here enter completely into that total enterprise. Ours must necessarily be a more modest task, but one which is a necessary stage in the total process. For if we effectively clarify Bonaventure's relation to other thinkers from his own perspective, we can more fruitfully enter into the larger dialogue among different traditions.

Bonaventure and Thomas

The first step in situating Bonaventure in the history of thought is to relate him to Thomas Aquinas. This is necessary since Thomas' thought has been made the focal point for interpreting medieval philosophy and theology. In the era of the neo-scholastic revival, Thomas' thought not only was adopted by many as their own philosophical system, but became the context in which most of the history of medieval thought was explored. Many philosophers and historians saw earlier medieval thought - in Augustine, Anselm, and Bonaventure - as stages leading up to the Aristotelian synthesis of Thomas, who inherited, corrected, and transformed this tradition through his own metaphysical genius and his use of Aristotle. This position implies that Thomas' thought should serve as a norm for judging other medieval thinkers. I do not wish to deal directly with this normative question here, since my task is one rather of description and interpretation on the level of internal structure. I wish simply to indicate that this position has caused the distinctive dimensions of Bonaventure and his tradition to be obscured. For some it meant that the earlier tradition was in continuity with Thomas, but not correctly and adequately developed; for others it meant that the earlier tradition was distinctly different, but since Thomas' position was superior, there was no compelling reason to enter within the inner structure of the other. Since I believe that Thomas' synthesis is considerably different from Bonaventure's and, in fact, represents another tradition, I believe that both of the above readings of the Middle Ages tended to obscure the indigenous structure and logic of Bonaventure's synthesis.⁴³² The result was that only those aspects of Bonaventure's thought were seriously studied that converged on the main concerns of Thomas. The chief thrust of my present study can be seen as an attempt to bring to light the obscured dimensions of Bonaventure's thought. In the light of our study of the coincidence of opposites, we can now compare Bonaventure and Thomas. To do this adequately would require a book. I can deal with the relation only schematically here, without giving the detailed sources from Thomas or the reasons that might substantiate my interpretation of his thought. Realizing that my statements will seem like sweeping generalization, I hope that they will at least raise issues for more detailed investigation and discussion. Seen against our analysis of the coincidence of opposites in Bonaventure, the thought of Thomas reveals itself as containing a different structure and logic. In Bonaventure the overarching model is the coincidence of opposites of complementarity, which has two major specifications: the dynamic Trinitarian model and the cosmological model of Christ the center. Both of these involve a threefold structure with two opposites coinciding in a midpoint or medium. These models do not exist in the same way in Thomas' system, which is built in a binary structure with such twofold patterns as follows: act/potency; existence/essence; necessary/contingent; form/matter; substance/accident. Further there is a concerted analysis of reality from the standpoint of the four causes: efficient, final, formal, and material. All of these notions are drawn by abstraction from the world of physical nature, which is conceived as the realm where reason can operate effectively and from which it can draw concepts and principles for reasoning to the existence and attributes of God. When divine revelation is given to man, he can further extend these categories analogously to study the mysteries of Christ, redemption, and the Trinity.⁴³³

Thomas' thought falls into the architectonic model of difference and not into the model of unity and difference of complementarity. Since the various polarities in his system are related as act and potency, there is a subordination of one to the other, with potency being subordinated to act. This is not the medium model of Bonaventure, in which the medium sustains the opposites. In Thomas the result of this subordinated bi-polarity is that it establishes a difference model between God and creation. In Thomas God and creation are viewed primarily from the standpoint of their difference, whereas in Bonaventure they are seen primarily from the standpoint of their coincidence. In Thomas God is seen as Pure Act and creation as contingent, dependent on God's power for its participation in the act of existence. Bonaventure, of course, also sees creation dependent on God and hence employs the act/potency model as well. But in his case, it is subordinated to the coincidence of opposites model of complementarity. While Thomas emphasizes the participated dependence of creatures on God, Bonaventure emphasizes their coincidence with God as mediated by the eternal Word in exemplar-ism.

In Thomas there is a further and more intimate involvement of God in the world through revelation, the Incarnation, and salvation history. This, however, is not interpreted according to the coincidence of opposites, but through God's freewill choice to communicate himself to men.⁴³⁴ As in the case of the contingency of creation, Bonaventure also maintains the freedom of God's grace, but this aspect of his thought is always integrated into the medium model of the coincidence of opposites. On the supernatural level, Thomas moves into the architectonic model of complementarity through the revelation of the mysteries of Christ and the Trinity. However, when he explores these mysteries theologically, he applies the categories drawn from nature - namely, the binary notions and the four causes - and does not draw his categories from the mysteries themselves as Bonaventure does.⁴³⁵ This indicates that Thomas and Bonaventure have radically different ways of conceiving the relation between philosophy and theology. Bonaventure draws his primary models from the Trinity and from Christ and applies them comprehensively to creation. Thomas draws his primary models from the realm of nature - seen through binary categories - and applies these, with the appropriate alterations, to the mysteries of revelation.⁴³⁶ Does this mean that Bonaventure has overstepped the bounds of reason? Not at all - at least, not within his system. For within the comprehensive extension of the architectonic model of complementarity, the Trinitarian and Christological models apply not only to the sphere of the mysteries themselves, but permeate the cosmos and its dynamics. I believe that the difference in the systems is not rooted in where Bonaventure and Thomas derive their Trinitarian models. Both derive them from revelation. The basic question is whether the Trinitarian models apply also to nature and can be discerned at least partially in nature, perhaps only after revelation. If so, then they establish a comprehensive Trinitarian logic to which binary logic is subordinated. That, I think, is Bonaventure's position. In contrast, Thomas conceives nature according to the binary model and reserves the Trinitarian model to revelation.⁴³⁷ From this statement of the question, the debate could proceed to whether it is more accurate to use Trinitarian or binary models in reading nature - or some combination of these or other models. If one holds that philosophy deals with nature and that nature has a binary structure, then one would come to Thomas's position on the relation of philosophy and theology. If, however, nature also has a Trinitarian structure, as well as a binary structure, then one could hold Bonaventure's position.

Bonaventure and His Predecessors

In the light of this understanding of the relation of philosophy and theology, it is possible to clarify the theological method found in Bonaventure's tradition, especially in Augustine, Anselm, and the Victorines. This tradition regularly uses models drawn from the Trinity to interpret the physical world as vestige and man as image. Furthermore, the Pseudo-Dionysius sees the self-diffusion of the good applying both to the Trinity and to creation. Bonaventure employs his notion of Christ the center to understand the dynamic orientation of space and time. This theological method has been described in general terms as faith seeking understanding (fides quaerens intellectum) and more specifically in Anselm, Richard of St. Victor, and Bonaventure as seeking for necessary reasons (rationes necessariae) for the mysteries of faith.⁴³⁸ Although both Thomas himself and contemporary Thomists have severely criticized this method of seeking rationes necessariae, I believe that it can be seen as a logically consistent method within the architectonic model of the tradition.⁴³⁹ This tradition believes that the mysteries of faith have their own ratio and logic which can be ascertained by reason's reflection on the mysteries revealed without using analogies drawn from the sense world. These mysteries can, in a partial way at least, yield their inner logic, which then is discerned as not merely limited to the mysteries but as forming an important dimension of the cosmos and of human experience and history. In this approach there is a Platonic element of descent from the archetype which is quite the reverse of the traditional Aristotelian ascent through analogy. In the Platonic perspective, for example, the Trinity is an archetype, whose traces are found throughout the universe and whose image is found in man. The fullness of the archetype is not known except through the Incarnation and the revelation of Jesus as the Son of the Father. But when that mystery is known, then the entire universe can be seen in its light. When one grasps the inner logic of the divine archetype - the ratio necessaria - then one can see more clearly relative realizations of this throughout creation. I believe that the logic of the archetype manifested in revelation and explored by this tradition is precisely the logic of the coincidence of opposites which we have studied in Bonaventure.

In the light of this analysis, it is apparent why the Trinity plays such a foundational role in the systems developed by Bonaventure's tradition. As we saw in Bonaventure's theology, there are two major models of the coincidence of opposites in the doctrine of the Trinity: the dynamic opposites of emanation and the opposites of unity and plurality. For Bonaventure's tradition these models operate in an absolute way in the Trinity and in a relative way in creation. In Bonaventure's tradition the notion of the One God - or the divine nature or Pure Act - plays a subordinate role to the Trinity. Because the Trinity does not have so important a function in the total structuring of Thomas' system, the place of the Trinity in medieval thought has not been adequately appreciated or investigated in the twentieth century.⁴⁴⁰ During the neo-scholastic revival, much more attention was given to the One-God and to man's knowledge of the One-God, in response to the Kantian critique.⁴⁴¹

Even when Thomas' doctrine of the Trinity was studied, it was not usually related to Bonaventure's tradition. The reason for this is complex. In his Trinitarian theology Thomas is distinctly Augustinian - developing to a point of technical refinement the basic Trinitarian theology laid out by Augustine in Books V-VII of the De Trinitate.⁴⁴² Here Augustine began with the common divine nature and saw the persons as mutual relations. In a similar way, in the Summa theologiae, Thomas begins with the divine nature and then proceeds to discuss the persons as subsistent relations.⁴⁴³ In this approach the unity of the divine nature is correlated with the plurality of persons, thus embodying the model of the coincidence of unity and plurality. For Bonaventure this model is subordinated to the emanation model, which is the foundation of his entire system. This emanation model came to him from the Greek Fathers through John Scotus Erigena's translations of the Pseudo-Dionysius, passing through the Victorines and Alexander of Hales. This tradition did not flow in the same way to Thomas, whose Trinitarian theology remained basically Augustinian. It is important to note that the emanation model of the Trinity is not thematized in a major way in Thomas's system. Against the background of the neo-scholastic period, this means that the significance of the Trinitarian emanation model in the Middle Ages has been obscured in the twentieth century. Although this is true of a general climate, nevertheless there has been important historical scholarship, beginning with the work of de Regnon, that can support a reassessment of the Trinitarian emanation model in the Middle Ages.⁴⁴⁴ Such a reassessment would, I believe, lead to an interesting reclassification of Bonaventure and Thomas. In general, the neo-scholastic revival has designated Bonaventure as Augustinian to distinguish him from Thomas the Aristotelian, especially in epistemology, where Bonaventure is more classically in the Augustinian illumination tradition than Thomas. However, in the area of Trinitarian theology, Thomas is the Augustinian and Bonaventure the heir of the Greek Fathers.

Once we strip away the Thomistic framework for interpreting the Middle Ages, we can more clearly discern Bonaventure's relation to his predecessors. In the light of our analysis of the coincidence of opposites, we can see more clearly the continuity of the tradition and Bonaventure's specific relation to it as a thirteenth century synthesizer. In control of its deepest structure and sensitive to its logic, he brought its elements to a new synthesis and a heightened self-consciousness. I personally believe that his greatest contribution to this tradition was to integrate its rich Trinitarian models with the emerging Franciscan sense of Christocentricity. In Bonaventure, we find more emphasis on the concrete humanity of Jesus than we do in his great predecessors, such as Augustine and the Pseudo-Dionysius. A significant change begins to appear in Anselm, although it is strongly focused on soteriology. In Bonaventure this trend blossoms into a cosmic Christocentricity, which incorporates the cosmological, soteriological and mystical dimensions of the mystery of Christ. Richly differentiated and developed, this Christological pole is integrated into the Trinitarian pole through Bonaventure's notion of Christ the medium, with its complex structures of the coincidence of opposites.

Controversy Over Aristotle

The coincidence of opposites can not only throw light on Bonaventure's relation to his predecessors and to Thomas, but can also clarify the stand that he took in the controversies of the thirteenth century. In addition to the dispute between the mendicants and the seculars, the two major controversies that involved Bonaventure were over Aristotle and Joachim of Fiore. Bonaventure's mature opinions on these controversies are stated in the Collationes in Hexaemeron, which also contain his most mature statement of the coincidence of opposites.⁴⁴⁵

Although Bonaventure incorporated much of Aristotle's thought into his own system, he severely criticized Aristotle on certain points. These issues were drawn into sharp focus by the development of a form of heterodox Aristotelianism in the faculty of arts at the University of Paris in the late 1260's and early 1270's. It is against this Aristotelianism that his polemic attacks are aimed in his three series of collationes, delivered in 1267, 1268, and 1273.⁴⁴⁶ In the sixth lecture of the series, the Collationes in Hexaemeron, Bonaventure summarizes his objections to various positions of Aristotle, relating them all to a single principle: exemplarism.⁴⁴⁷ Because Aristotle rejected the ideas of Plato, he fell into a series of errors. Bonaventure's strong feelings on this matter are expressed in the term he uses, saying that Aristotle "cursed" the ideas of Plato.⁴⁴⁸ Hence Aristotle claims that God knows only himself, that he has no need of the knowledge of anything else and that he moves creatures in so far as he is desired and loved. It follows, then, that God knows no particular thing.

From this fundamental error two others follow: that God exercises no providence nor judgment over the world. First, from the rejection of exemplarism, there follows another error, "that is, that God has neither foreknowledge nor providence, since he does not have within himself the reasons (rationes) of things through which he could know them." Since there are no truths about the future except what is necessary, it follows that all things come about by chance or by necessity. Because they reject chance, the Arabs "conclude to the necessity of fate, that is, that these substances that move the world are the necessary causes of all things." If all things are determined, there is no basis for reward and punishment in the afterlife.⁴⁴⁹

Bonaventure's attack goes right to the heart of the central issue as he sees it. Aristotle has radically separated God and the world by eliminating the medium between the two. Aristotle's model of difference is incompatible with Bonaventure's model of complementarity. As Bonaventure asserted in his introductory collatio, Christ is the medium metaphysicum, in whose eternal generation from the Father are produced the archetypes or ideas of all that can be created.⁴⁵⁰ These archetypes are the medium between God and the world. Without them the world is severed from God and paradoxically made the slave of rigid necessity. For Aristotle there can be only difference, no coincidence of opposites.

From Aristotle's basic cluster of errors there follows, Bonaventure claims, a threefold blindness or darkness; namely, that the world is eternal, that there is a single intellect, and that there is no personal immortality. Bonaventure presents the reasoning as follows:

For if the world is supposed to be eternal, one of the following propositions necessarily follows: that souls are infinite in number since there would be an infinite number of men; or that the soul is corruptible; or that it is transmitted from body to body; or that there is a single intellect in all [rational beings], an error attributed to Aristotle by his commentator.

From these two propositions it follows that after this life there is neither happiness nor punishment.⁴⁵¹

Because Aristotle has fallen into error by rejecting exemplar-ism, he was blind to the issues involved in the eternity of the world and the consequent loss of radical personal identity. As Bonaventure sees it, the plurality involved in an eternal world contradicts genuine personal individuality. This atomistic plurality leads to an undifferentiated union of all in the single intellect which ultimately absorbs all men. In this view, there is no coincidence of opposites which grounds individuality in complementarity such as we see in Bonaventure's notion of the soul as image, similitude, and spouse of Christ.

Throughout his writings Bonaventure engaged in a polemic against Aristotle's doctrine of the eternity of the world, which he considered impossible, unlike Thomas, who thought it a philosophical possibility but not a fact since we know by revelation that the world was created in time.⁴⁵² I believe that the ultimate root of Bonaventure's rejection of Aristotle's eternal world lies in the architectonic model which controls his system. In the model of complementarity with its coincidence of opposites, Bonaventure has integrated the Hebrew notion of time with the Greek notion of the self-diffusion of the good. For Bonaventure God is related to time not as Pure Act, but as self-diffusive Trinity. From this perspective God is not the Unmoved Mover of an eternal temporal flux in which individuals in infinite number merely repeat themselves endlessly. Rather he is the dynamic Trinity whose inner life involves an exitus and reditus in which the Son is the persona media. If time flows out of this dynamism, then it too must share in the same model: it must move out from God as Alpha and return to God as Omega. If we add to this Trinitarian model of the temporal process the mystery of the Incarnation with its implications of Christ the center of history, then we see that the Trinitarian model of the process is intensified by the Christocentric model. A Trinitized, Christocentric process cannot be devoid of centering and stripped of personality and immortality like the aimless flux that Bonaventure saw in Aristotle's eternal world.

Joachim of Fiore and Radical Eschatology

One can interpret Bonaventure as steering a middle course between the eternal world of Aristotle and the radical eschatology of Joachim of Fiore. By holding the doctrine of Christ the medium Bonaventure was able to affirm what was politically a moderate position within the Franciscan Order and theoretically a mid-position between the endless process of Aristotle and the radically negating process of Joachim. From Bonaventure's perspective, Aristotle's temporal process was not Trinitized and Joachim's was Trinitized according to a faulty model, which ultimately negated the Trinity and Christocentricity.

The problems associated with Joachim of Fiore were interwoven into the early history of the Franciscan Order and the events of Bonaventure's life.⁴⁵³ The roots of the issues go back to the tensions between three groups within the Order: (1) the Spirituals, who espoused exclusively the simplicity of Francis' ideals; (2) the relaxed, who were willing to depart substantially from these ideals; and (3) the moderates, who wished to remain faithful to the ideals but admitted adaptation and evolution. Some of the Spirituals drew from the eschatology of the twelfth century Calabrian monk Joachim of Fiore to support their position. They claimed that a new age of the Spirit had been ushered in by Francis and that the institutionalization proposed by the moderates had been radically superseded by this new age. While Bonaventure was embroiled in the disputes at the University of Paris between the seculars and the mendicants, Joachite elements were introduced into the controversy by the Liber introductorius in evangelium aeternum of Friar Gerard of Borgo San Donnino.⁴⁵⁴ Not long after this Joachite problems precipitated Bonaventure's election as General when John of Parma was forced to resign because of his Joachite leanings. Throughout Bonaventure's life Joachite tensions continued within the Order, reaching a climax in the fourteenth century with the suppression of the radical group called the Fraticelli.⁴⁵⁵

Joachim proposed a theory that there are three ages of history corresponding to the three persons of the Trinity.⁴⁵⁶ The age of the Father extends from Adam to Christ and is characterized by the married state. This is followed by the age of the Son, which is characterized by the clerical state and which will be superseded by the age of the Spirit, characterized by the monastic state. This third period, which began with Benedict, was to reach its flowering in a spiritual age that was to be ushered in, according to Joachim's prediction, in the imminent future. What makes his thought radical is that he saw in the age of the Spirit the triumph of the spiritual and the charismatic over the institutional forms of the previous age.

Bonaventure's relation to the Joachite tradition is complex. On the practical level, he emerged as a leader of the moderates against the radical Spirituals, a position which he maintained through his life. But one can trace in his thought a growing eschatological consciousness and a tendency to interpret Francis in this context. As Ratzinger has pointed out, Bonaventure has incorporated some Joachite elements into his thought, or one could say that he developed his own position in ways that approximate certain Joachite positions.⁴⁵⁷ However, there always remained a basic incompatibility between the architectonic models of Bonaventure's thought and those of Joachim. Bonaventure's integral Trinitarian model, in which Christ is the persona media, prevents him from adopting the divisive Trinitarian model of Joachim, in which the age of the Spirit radically negates the age of the Son. Furthermore, the full development of his notion of Christ the medium in the first Collatio in Hexaemeron intensifies his position against Joachim. In the context of his integral Trinitarianism and his Christocentricity, we can see that Bonaventure's view was politically moderate because it was theoretically integral. For Bonaventure the processes of history move forward towards an eschatological spiritualization, which has a radical dimension, true; but this goal is always achieved through an integral Trinitarian dynamism and a Christocentricity. It is precisely because Bonaventure holds the coincidence of opposites - in all five classes we studied above - that he can be true to the radical side of Francis and to the conservative side of the tradition, and so be properly characterized as a moderate.

Bonaventure and Nicholas of Cusa

Bonaventure's synthesis of his tradition not only represents a high point of development; it also represents the end of an era. The new Aristotelianism triumphed in the thirteenth century with the result that subsequent formulation of theological and philosophical problems was done within an Aristotelian context. Bonaventure's tradition was transmitted by the mystical currents of the later Middle Ages but emerged later at certain periods within the areas of philosophy and theology. One of the most significant representatives of this tradition in subsequent thought was Nicholas of Cusa.⁴⁵⁸ Our study of the coincidence of opposites makes it possible to explore some of the similarities and differences between his thought and Bonaventure's.

In a special way our present study calls for a comparison between Bonaventure and Nicholas of Cusa, for the latter immediately comes to mind when one hears the term the coincidentia oppositorum. It was Nicholas, who in the history of Western thought consecrated the term and brought the coincidence of opposites to a level of self-reflective consciousness. It becomes for Nicholas a self-reflective logic based on a metaphysics, and it was used methodologically in his study of the Trinity, God and creation, and the doctrine of Christ. This means, of course, that Nicholas brought his understanding of the coincidence of opposites to a greater level of self-reflection than Bonaventure did. This leads us to two questions: how are Nicholas and Bonaventure related historically? And how similar are the two thinkers on the coincidence of opposites?

It is abundantly clear that both writers are in the same large current of Western thought which I previously called the Christian Neo-Platonic tradition. Both writers were significantly influenced by the Pseudo-Dionysius and hence by the theology of the Greek Fathers. Bonaventure's Trinitarian theology and his mystical writings are profoundly shaped by the Pseudo-Dionysius; the docta ignorantia of Nicholas can be interpreted as a way of incorporating the negative theology of the Pseudo-Dionysius into his system.⁴⁵⁹ It is interesting to note that in addition to this Greek influence on their thought, both men played significant roles to effect the reunion of the Greek East and the Latin West: Bonaventure at the Council of Lyons and Nicholas at the Council of Florence.

Granted that their thought has affinity because it belongs to a common tradition, the further question arises: Did Bonaventure have a direct influence on Nicholas, and specifically did he have a direct influence in shaping Nicholas's understanding of the coincidence of opposites? Certainly Nicholas read Bonaventure, especially the Itinerarium, the Breviloquium, and the Collationes in Hexaemeron. There is reason to think that Nicholas first came upon the term docta ignorantia in the Breviloquium of Bonaventure: there is also reason to think that Nicholas was influenced by the passages in Bonaventure's Itinerarium and Collationes in Hexaemeron which contain an almost explicit treatment of the coincidence of opposites.⁴⁶⁰

This brings us to the second question: How similar is the coincidence of opposites in these thinkers? In dealing with this question, I will follow the methodology employed throughout the book: namely, to analyze whatever types of coincidence of opposites found in a man's thought, without taking any particular form as the norm. I will conclude that there are both similarities and differences in the two thinkers and that, in a certain sense, they had different understandings of the coincidence of opposites. This means that I am not taking Nicholas' version as the sole possible form, merely because he is the first to have made it self-reflective; nor am I taking his version as the norm.

Since I will use it systematically to relate Bonaventure and Nicholas, it might be wise to recall the scheme of three architectonic models of the coincidence of opposites which I presented in the first chapter: (1) unity; (2) difference; and (3) unity and difference.⁴⁶¹ In the first, opposites coincide so much that they become one. In this monistic view, opposites are swallowed up in an undifferentiated union. In the second model, there is a radical dualism, in which the opposites persist to such an extent that they repel each other, preventing any genuine union. In the third model, there is both difference and unity. While remaining opposites, they coincide in a union that intensifies their difference. This is a union of mutually affirming complementarity. As I have stated throughout, I believe that Bonaventure's coincidence of opposites falls consistently within this third model, through his notion of Christ the medium. In the case of Nicholas, I believe that there is a tension between the first and the third: that is, between a monistic coincidence and one of mutual complementarity.

When we compare Nicholas' system with that of Bonaventure, we find the same structural elements but with different emphases and, I believe, with certain differences in the coincidence of opposites. Since Nicholas is in the same generic tradition as Bonaventure, we find the following common themes: the non-manifesting and manifesting poles of the divinity; the dynamic Trinity, expressed chiefly by Nicholas through the Father as unity, the Son as equality, and the Spirit as connection; this dynamic level leads to the coincidence of unity and plurality in the divinity; exemplarism, although this is much more developed in Bonaventure than in Nicholas; and a doctrine of Christ as center.⁴⁶²

Although these elements are present in Nicholas' thought, they do not have the same function in his system that they have in Bonaventure's. For example, in Bonaventure the emanation model of the Trinity is central. Derived from the Greek Fathers through the Pseudo-Dionysius, this emanation model emphasizes the fecundity and dynamism of the Father in the Trinitarian processions. In contrast, Nicholas is much more in the Augustinian tradition - not merely because he uses the Augustinian terms of unity, equality, and connection, but because, like Augustine, he is much more interested in the Trinity as a mystery of unity and diversity than as a mystery of the divine emanation. This produces a significant difference in the coincidence of opposites. In Bonaventure the dynamic coincidence of opposites predominates, that is, the coincidence of emanation and return; however in Nicholas the more static coincidence of unity and plurality predominates.⁴⁶³

Perhaps the greatest difference lies in the area of God's relation to the world. As a disciple and interpreter of Francis of Assisi, Bonaventure is primarily concerned with God's presence in the universe. This leads him to find the highest in the lowest, the most significant reality in the least. This paradox - embodied in the personality of the poverello and in Franciscan humility and poverty - Bonaventure sees as the universal structure of reality, rooted in Trinitarian exemplarism. Through contemplation of the world, Bonaventure leads us back to the Exemplar of all things, the Trinitarian Word, who is the medium through whom opposites coincide.

Nicholas, on the other hand, is primarily interested in mathematical and philosophical problems dealing with infinity and in the coincidence of the maximum and the minimum. He moves from the world of multiplicity, of contradictions and contraries to God, where opposites coincide in the divine unity; for in God the maximum and the minimum coincide. God is the maximum who cannot be greater, and he is the minimum since he cannot be less; therefore the maximum and the minimum coincide in him.⁴⁶⁴ From one point of view, this type of coincidence of opposites can be interpreted in a monistic sense, since the polarities in the world are transcended in the undifferentiated unity of God. From another point of view, this coincidence can be considered a mathematical route into the classic doctrine of exemplarism, shared by Bonaventure, and hence would reflect the coincidence of the third class, namely, of mutual complementarity. In any case, this much can be said: Nicholas emphasized the coincidence of the maximum and the minimum, and Bonaventure a coincidence through the medium, who is Christ. This coincidence through medium is much more clearly in the third class than is Nicholas's coincidence of the maximum and minimum.

The area where Bonaventure and Nicholas are closest is Christology. The following passage from Nicholas' De docta ignorantia presents a vision of Christ very similar to Bonaventure's conception of Christ the medium. However, in characteristic fashion, Nicholas analyzes the mystery of Christ from the standpoint of the maximum and the minimum, although here his approach converges with Bonaventure's analysis through the notion of medium.

In him [Christ] the smallest things of nature, the greatest and all between, would so coincide in a nature united with the absolute maximum, as to form in him the perfection of all things; and all things, in their limitation, would repose in him as in their perfection. . . . By him who is the maximum in limitation, all things are to come forth into their limited being from the Absolute Maximum, and by means of him revert to the maximum. For he is the first beginning of their setting forth and the last end of their return.⁴⁶⁵

On the level of architectonic structure the vision of Bonaventure and that of Nicholas are very similar since they are in the same generic tradition. In all major areas, this architectonic structure contains the logic of the coincidence of opposites: in the doctrine of God, of God's relation to the world, and in Christology. Moreover, this coincidence of opposites is clearly of the class of unity and difference, or mutual complementarity. Bonaventure's treatment of this type of coincidence through the notion of medium brings its distinctive nature to light, even though he does not use the term coincidentia oppositorum nor bring the pattern to self-consciousness as an abstract model. Although Nicholas brings the coincidence of opposites to an abstract self-consciousness, there is a tension in his thought between a monistic coincidence and one of mutual complementarity. In his later writings, however, he moves closer to Bonaventure - more clearly and consistently within the framework of mutual complementarity.⁴⁶⁶

As Bonaventure's tradition moves through the subsequent centuries, it diversifies considerably, partially because of the major cultural revolutions it encounters and expresses, partially because it lacks the self-consciousness of its own continuity that it possessed in the Middle Ages. As it flows into the contemporary scene, it becomes the vehicle through which modern man becomes aware of some of his major problems and possibilities in the twentieth century. Through the coincidence of opposites we can identify the threads of this tradition and their relatedness to Bonaventure; and we can bring Bonaventure into dialogue with contemporary thinkers as they attempt to chart man's journey into the future. This will be the task of our next chapter.

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